Bangladesh: A nation in political and geopolitical flux

Dipak Kurmi

(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com.)

As the seasons change, Bangladesh finds itself in the throes of a political upheaval unlike any seen in recent history. The student-led revolt of August, which ultimately led to the ousting of Sheikh Hasina, has not only thrown the country into a chaotic breakdown of law and order but has also set the stage for shifting geopolitical alignments that may redefine the nation’s future. With the streets of Dhaka reverberating with unrest, political actors scrambling to realign their interests, and regional powers recalibrating their stakes, the political landscape of Bangladesh is evolving at a rapid pace.

The crisis took an unprecedented turn on February 23, when students from Dhaka University orchestrated a midnight demonstration demanding the resignation of Home Affairs Advisor Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, a retired lieutenant general. Their demands stemmed from the government’s failure to curb rampant crime, extortion, and violent attacks on liberals and women. In a desperate attempt to restore credibility, Chowdhury held a press conference at 2:30 am, only for it to be overshadowed by a violent attack on journalists, further exposing the administration’s inability to maintain internal security. Two days later, the country’s army chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, issued a stark warning to the political class, stating unequivocally that the ongoing violence threatened Bangladesh’s sovereignty and stability. His remarks carried an unmistakable undertone: the military would not tolerate further deterioration of law and order.

The general’s warning extended beyond domestic politics. In a significant statement, he urged political factions—including the Awami League, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and Jamaat-e-Islami—to refrain from infighting and cease efforts to secure the release of those involved in the 2009 border guard mutiny, a dark chapter in Bangladesh’s recent history that saw the massacre of army officers. His call for a December election put to rest speculations that the interim government, led by Nobel laureate Mohammed Yunus, might delay the electoral process under the guise of systemic reform. This intervention suggests that the military is reasserting its role as the ultimate guardian of state stability, much like its historical precedents under generals such as Hussein Muhammad Ershad and Moeen U Ahmed.

The geopolitical dimension of this crisis is equally significant. General Zaman’s speech notably refrained from acknowledging Yunus’s government by its formal designation, instead referring to him by name—a sign that the military is distancing itself from his administration. This realignment comes in the wake of reports suggesting that Yunus’s rise was facilitated by U.S. influence, particularly under the Biden administration. Allegations of an American-backed “colour revolution” gained traction, with many believing that Washington’s deep state had worked behind the scenes to orchestrate the regime change. However, with Donald Trump’s return to political prominence and his reported assurance to Prime Minister Narendra Modi that the U.S. would “leave Bangladesh” for India to manage, the equation appears to have shifted once again.

Bangladesh’s political actors have taken note of this changing geopolitical calculus. As the crisis deepens, leaders from the BNP, Awami League, and Jamaat have sought Delhi’s favour, with delegations making their way to India to position themselves as the best partners for Raisina Hill. Simultaneously, the emergence of the National Citizen’s Party—a student-led political entity widely believed to have Yunus’s backing—signals an attempt to consolidate the anti-Hasina forces into a cohesive electoral bloc. However, public support for the student movement appears to be waning, with widespread frustration over lawlessness, economic instability, and the erosion of democratic norms.

Perhaps the most symbolic event of this turbulence was the attack on the historic 32 Dhanmondi residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, which was set ablaze alongside a museum dedicated to his legacy. The incident has deepened the rift between those who view Mujib’s family as symbols of authoritarianism and those who see them as the rightful torchbearers of Bangladesh’s founding ideals. Hasina’s virtual address to her supporters from India further fuelled tensions with protests escalating across the country. BNP Secretary-General Faqrul Aslam Alamgir, while initially condemning the violence, later called for India to extradite Hasina and her aides for trial, underscoring the deep animosity within the opposition.

India’s response to these developments has been measured but firm. The Indian government condemned the violence as “regrettable,” leading to the summoning of its acting high commissioner in Dhaka. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s visit to Bangladesh and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s recent discussions with Bangladesh’s interim leadership reflect Delhi’s efforts to navigate the crisis diplomatically. However, the underlying tension remains palpable. India’s historical support for Hasina and the Awami League has long been a point of contention in Bangladesh, where many see New Delhi’s involvement as undue interference. While strategic interests necessitate India’s engagement, the changing political tides in Bangladesh indicate that Delhi may need to recalibrate its approach.

The parallels with other regional upheavals are striking. Like Nepal’s post-civil war transition, Bangladesh is undergoing a fundamental restructuring of its political landscape. The events of August 2024 marked a definitive shift, with traditional power structures crumbling and new forces vying for dominance. The key questions now revolve around the upcoming elections: Will they be free and fair? Will Awami League be allowed to participate? Will political violence escalate, turning the polls into yet another battleground?

Another crucial factor is the erosion of India’s historical goodwill in Bangladesh. The generation that fought the 1971 Liberation War has faded, and the younger demographic no longer views India as the indispensable ally it once was. The evolving historical narrative—evident in institutions like the Liberation War Museum—depicts India’s role as a secondary one, with the Mukti Bahini and local resistance taking centre stage. This shift is not merely academic; it reflects a broader reconfiguration of national identity, one that distances Bangladesh from its erstwhile benefactor.

In this volatile environment, the costs of India’s continued support for Hasina are becoming increasingly apparent. While Delhi has traditionally provided refuge to leaders from Nepal, Afghanistan, Myanmar, and the Maldives, Hasina’s prolonged stay in India carries strategic risks. The perception of India as an external meddler could further alienate key political factions in Bangladesh, undermining long-term bilateral relations.

As the crisis unfolds, Bangladesh stands at a crossroads. The coming months will determine whether the nation descends into deeper chaos or finds a path toward stability. With multiple actors—domestic and international—jockeying for influence, the stakes could not be higher. One thing is certain: the Bangladesh that emerges from this turbulence will be fundamentally different from the one that existed before August 2024. The Great Game of South Asian geopolitics is entering a new phase, and the reverberations will be felt far beyond the borders of this embattled nation.