China in Myanmar: A threat to India’s Northeast

Amitava Mukherjee

(The author is a senior journalist and commentator. He can be reached at amitavamukherjee253@gmail.com)

While most of the world is engrossed with happenings in Ukraine and the Middle East, China has quietly tightened its grip in Myanmar, raising security concerns for India’s northeastern states. Beijing’s strategy is clear; it is maintaining good relations with both the military junta in Naypyidaw and the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) in order to secure safety for its investments, particularly the oil and gas pipeline that originates in Kyaukpyu port and reaches the Yunnan province in China’s southwest. Although it had cobbled up a pro-Beijing conglomeration of EAOs called the Three Brotherhood, which now controls large parts of Myanmar, China ultimately restrained them from dethroning the junta under the apprehension that the resultant chaos may pave the way for a smooth entry to a position of strength for the fighters aligned to the pro-west National Unity Government (NUG), a government in exile composed of functionaries from the National League of Democracy and various other sections of Myanmar society.

So far as Myanmar is concerned, Indian foreign policy has twice suffered from misjudgment, and it is now high time that New Delhi correctly reads the goings-on in its neighbouring country. In 1988 India reposed great faith in the capacity of the democratic movement led by the National League for Democracy of Aung San Suu Kyi. Instead, the Tatmadaw (this is how the Myanmar army is called) firmly saddled itself to power and continued for a long time. This time New Delhi seems to have decided not to antagonise the army. There may be some reasons behind it, as a total victory of the EAOs is likely to lead to a vivisection of Myanmar, which would certainly result in ethnicity-related increased turmoil in several northeastern states of India. Reality, however, points out the crying need for political-level engagements between New Delhi and several EAOs. Interactions are there now but only at the official level.

The situation is dicey for New Delhi, as northeastern India’s security and connectivity are dependent on situations in Myanmar to a large extent. EAOs operating along the India and Thailand borders are mostly pro-western in nature, while those in the north and northeastof Myanmar are pro-Chinese. From India’s point of view, pro-West EAOs are certainly more acceptable than the pro-China ones. However, New Delhi’s decision to raise border fencing has raised suspicion among the fighters allied to the National Unity Government, which is pro-West.

However, some amounts of restrictions along the Indo-Myanmar border are also necessary, as ethnic settlements often overlap on both sides of the border. This issue is alleged to have dogged the Manipur conflict, as the Kuki-Zo community has a significant number of ethnic brethren in the Chin state of Myanmar, which abuts parts of Manipur. At the same time, cross-border interactions among ethnic tribes are also necessary for their existence, as they have traditional mutually dependent economic systems. Following the Indo-Bangladesh relations model, a number of government-sponsored ‘haats’ can be opened where people from both sides of the border can come and carry out trade transactions.

Here lies an important question—the need for dialogue with the ethnic armed organizations. They now control large chunks of Myanmar territory and run self-sufficient governments in their respective areas. Without their cooperation no such ‘hats’ can be meaningful. Secondly, and the most important point, is the safety, security, and timely completion of India-sponsored infrastructure projects, the most important of them being the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Project. Without the EAO’s cooperation, completion of this project is nearly impossible.

Kaladan is a transit project for lessening the dependence on the Siliguri corridor (a narrow strip of land between Bangladesh and Nepal with China on the north) in matters of communication with northeastern India. Goods will be shipped from Kolkata as well as other eastern Indian ports to the Sittwe port in the Rakhine state of Myanmar, situated on the Indian Ocean. From Sittwe the shipments will be carried via the Kaladan River to Paletwa in the Chin State. From Paletwa they will be taken to Mizoram, India, by road.

For several reasons, both infrastructural and insurgency-related, the Kaladan project is running way behind schedule. New Delhi’s alternative arrangement, an agreement with the previous Hasina Wazed government of Bangladesh by which India would use the Chittagong port first for sending and then transhipping Indian goods to Sabrum in Tripura, has also run aground due to the fall of the Hasina government. So the importance of the Kaladan project has again resurfaced. But, for its completion, New Delhi needs the cooperation of the Arakan Army (AA), which now controls almost the whole of the Rakhine state except its capital, Sittwe. Paletwa in the Chin state is also under its control. It means that most of the area covered by the Kaladan project comes under the influence of the Arakan Army.

But there is a mutual distrust between the Arakan Army and New Delhi. The outfit had previously kidnapped some Indian engineers working on the Kaladan project. On its part, the AA also accuses the government of India of murdering a good number of leaders and cadres of the National United Party of Arakan, another organisation that dominated the Rakhine landscape previously. However, rapprochement between the two is quite possible. To the Arakan Army, the central Myanmar border is blocked by the Tatmadaw. In the northwest the state has borders with Bangladesh, but the Arakan Army’s relation with the Bangladesh administration is prickly. So the Indian border is extremely important for the AA for provisions, both for its military and for the civilian population.

However, there are indications that from mid-2024some serious interactions between the AA and the Government of India have commenced. Grapevine has it that the Government of India is kept informed about the progress of work at Paletwa. But there is a hitch. The Arakan Army is a part of the China-sponsored Three Brotherhood. However, informed circles are of the opinion that the AA is reported to have sent signals that it is not a proxy of China.

Be that as it may, Myanmar is now a real diplomatic test for India. The country is central to the success or failure of India’s Act East policy. Both China and India are a bit confused about their respective Myanmar policies. Up to a certain point in time, Beijing extended full support to the Ethnic Armed Organisations. But after the latter’ stunning success against the Tatmadaw in Shan State, China became hesitant. A reorientation in its policy took place, and a China-enforced status quo came over.

Compared to China, India is maintaining a bit more distance with Myanmar affairs and has rightly steered clear of any direct involvement. But given the hostile situation in Bangladesh, the Kaladan project has again assumed high strategic importance. We are uncertain about the thoughts and intentions of the policymakers in New Delhi. But without cooperation from the EAOs completion of the Kaladan project might turn out to be difficult.