Chinese chequers amid Indo-Pak conflict

Kumar Sanjay Krishna

(Kumar Sanjay Krishna was Chief Secretary, Assam.)

Jaideep Saikia 

(Jaideep Saikia is India’s foremost strategist and bestselling author.)

It is true that in the “midst of chaos there is opportunity”, so said the Chinese master strate-gist of yore, Sun Tzu.

The recent skirmish between India and Pakistan was just such an opportunity for the People’s Republic of China. Occasions like these rarely come by. Beijing grabbed it with full eagerness and ferocity.

The Chinese PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) had long been waiting to war-game its Chengdu fighter in a conflict theatre that had both India and Taiwan as targets. The terrains are naturally very different. But the notable variants of the Chengdu fighter (J-20), it is reported, have been adapted for both the Himalayan and the maritime; the latter, of course, is for Taiwan-specific conditions.

The fact that China jointly manufactured the Joint Fighter (JF-10) series with Pakistan is interesting. The acquisition by Pakistan was naturally against growing Indian air superiority. But it was against the Sukhois. India’s Rafale addition was primarily China-orientated. Dassault Rafale was the right weapon against possible Chinese assaults as well as cross-country strikes into PLAAF air bases such as Xigatse and Chamdo Pangta in Tibet. The Rafales’ payload lift capacity is greater than the Chinese J-series. This is perhaps the reason for its primary deployment in North Bengal as opposed to the Sukhois deployment in Assam.

The Tibetan plateau is not very conducive to the PLAAF’s air fleet as opposed to the Rafale for a number of reasons. The most important aspect is that Chinese airbases in Tibet are placed at high altitudes. It reduces, as aforesaid, the payload capacity, including fuel and armament, of the fighters. But such shortcomings have reportedly been offset by inducting air refuelers such as the Xian YY-20A, a domestically developed tanker variant, as well as, of course, the IL-78.

Although a definitive report about the manner in which the aerial strike by the IAF during Op Sindoor occurred would have to await declassification, the fact that the Sino-Pak manufactured Joint Fighter (JF-10), the strengthened generation of which is the J-20, had never been war tested. Pahalgam gave China the opportunity. It had never been validated for platform strike missions.

Pahalgam had to be countered. The Indian Republic, rightfully, were baying for blood. But tactically speaking, there has been studied silence (amid reluctant admission) that the Joint Fighter was able to hold its own against the Rafale or even the fewer deployment of Sukhois during the recent air skirmish. Therefore, India needs to recalibrate and comprehend the otherwise comprehensive air attack scenario against Pakistan, especially as it used forceful air power without “crossing” into enemy territory.

Indeed, since it has already exhibited its capability, it must now closely understand Pakistan’s air defence system and the engagement skills of the adversary’s JF-10s, which were endowed with Chinese PL-15 missile carriages.

Rafaels and Sukhois were meant for shying off Chinese air intrusions in the Eastern Sector, where the possibility of a Chinese strike is more likely. India’s air exercise Gagan Shakti had validated cross-Tibetan air aggression by the PLAAF and had (during the tenure of the late Air Marshal P.K. Barbora, who was then the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Air Command, Indian Air Force (IAF)) operationalised almost all Line-of-Control proximate Advanced Landing Grounds in Arunachal Pradesh. However, the preferred platform for the air bases in Chabua, Salonibari and Rowriah in Assam was the Sukhoi. The Rafale, particularly, worked well in a posture that had North Sikkim in its pre-defined combat zone deployment.

But tactical targets in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and deeper significant targets (which had to be eventually targeted) into Punjab-Pakistan were not in the Rafales’ sights. Pahalgam hastened such an unanticipated disposition. But the unforeseen repositioning notwithstanding, the fact of the matter is that the Rafale proved equal to the task allotted to it. The debate that continues to ensue about the loss of Rafales in the brief conflict is not only unfortunate but immature. India attained its objective over a foul adversary and in record time. The debate should have ended there! If prying Western eyes and busybodies in India are attempting a post-mortem after the enemy’s sinister strongholds have been consigned to flames, then it can only be termed as an exercise in futility. It is the considered opinion of the authors that the Government of India or the Indian armed forces should have nothing more to say.

In any event, India’s intention of hitting terror encampments without crossing either the International Border or the Line of Control (LC) proved to be correct. The calibrated Indian air strike on nine Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and sundry other Islamist terror staging camps was precise and accurate. Only time and history will inform the correct magnitude of the damage that the IAF was able to exact on Pakistan. But that it was substantial has been agreed to even by western sources.

China watched and weighed its bets. The IAF not only hit targets in Muzaffarabad, but its strike capability also reached places like Bahawalpur and Sialkot. The Rafales could have struck targets in Islamabad and Rawalpindi as well. But Op Sindoor had a singular objective: to teach Pakistan a lesson. It was achieved with pride by India.

As far as the air defence capabilities of India are concerned, it was capital. Although the manner in which to was able to stave off 90% of the enemy drone attacks continues to be in the domain of the privileged, the fact of the matter is that Pakistan was not able to inflict the sort of damage that it had expected to by way of retaliation on India for what was the latter’s just war against the former’s unjust act of wanton terror on peace-loving India.

But even as India struck back tenfold on an adversary sponsoring terror, it needs to ideate the Chinese way of wargaming. It is not the authors’ belief that the Chinese had a hand in Pahalgam. But that it was closely watching the unfolding game is no longer in question. The Chinese never enter a game without first observing it from afar. Indeed, strategists would recall how Beijing avidly followed the Iraq War and calibrated its war ways in light of American mistakes and successes.

India, if it has not already, must factor in this interesting Chinese feature. One of the authors of this article, Jaideep Saikia, was a sole visitor to China for a Track-II Dialogue in 2002. He participated as a part of the Indian delegation in yet another Track-II Dialogue with China in 2014. Apart from the professionalism that was witnessed about the Chinese (even as they went about the most insignificant of work), one of the remarkable characteristics about them was that they are continually observing. This is an important aspect that India has to bear in mind about its rival in the north and internalise.

The need to emulate the Chinese manner of observation notwithstanding, the fact remains that Pahalgam has been avenged. It is Modi hour, and the “Great Helmsman” has to be hailed. Sindoor has once again been graciously anointed on the forehead of Bharat, that is, India.