Dhaka to Sindoor: Revisiting 1971 in Modi’s South Asia

Dipak Kurmi

(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com.)

The secession of East Pakistan in 1971, culminating in the birth of Bangladesh, stands as one of the most transformative events in South Asia's geopolitical history. This seismic shift, orchestrated through India's decisive intervention under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, not only redrew the map of the subcontinent but also reshaped regional power dynamics. Yet, over half a century later, the event has resurfaced as a political flashpoint in India, with the Congress Party invoking Gandhi's legacy to challenge Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent military operation, Sindoor, launched on May 7 and paused on May 10, 2025. Hailed as a success in humbling Pakistan, Operation Sindoor has nonetheless stirred controversy, drawing ire from Pakistan, China, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and even domestic critics like the Congress Party. By resurrecting Gandhi's role in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, Congress seeks to underscore her unparalleled achievement in dismantling Pakistan's unity, contrasting it with Modi's more recent efforts. This debate not only rekindles historical rivalries but also prompts a deeper examination of whether India's intervention in 1971 was an unmitigated triumph or a complex legacy fraught with unintended consequences.

The roots of the 1971 conflict trace back to the partition of British India in 1947, a hasty and chaotic process overseen by Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy. Tasked with dividing the subcontinent into India and Pakistan, Sir Cyril Radcliffe was given a mere five weeks to draw boundaries, a monumental task he approached with limited time and resources. Guided by Mohammed Ali Jinnah's two-nation theory, which posited Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims and India for Hindus, Radcliffe's demarcation created what has been described as the largest enclave in world history. India, predominantly Hindu, was sandwiched between West Pakistan and East Pakistan, both Muslim-majority regions separated by approximately 2,020 kilometres of Indian territory. This geographical quirk-comparable to the distance between New Delhi and Chennai, where India's governance runs uninterrupted-meant that Pakistan's writ was severely constrained across the vast Indian expanse separating its two wings. The cultural and ethnic disparities between the Bengali-speaking East Pakistanis and the Urdu-speaking West Pakistanis further exacerbated tensions, setting the stage for inevitable conflict.

East Pakistan's secessionist aspirations were galvanized by the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, whose calls for autonomy gained momentum in the late 1960s. The tipping point came in 1970, when the Awami League secured a spectacular victory in Pakistan's general election, winning 169 of 313 parliamentary seats. Yet, the Pakistani military junta, led by General Yahya Khan, refused to swear in Mujibur Rahman as prime minister, instead launching Operation Searchlight on March 25, 1971, a brutal crackdown that initiated the Bangladesh genocide. According to Pakistan's Hamoodur Rahman Commission, at least 26,000 people were killed, though Bangladeshi estimates place the death toll as high as three million, with over 300,000 women subjected to systematic rape as a weapon of war. The violence triggered a massive refugee crisis, with 10 million East Pakistanis fleeing to India, straining its resources and prompting Indira Gandhi to act. She argued that military intervention was more economically viable than sustaining the refugee influx, a stance she framed as humanitarian, telling British writer Dom Moraes that India "couldn't stand by and see a whole population liquidated".

India's support for the Bengali cause was multifaceted, combining diplomatic, political, and military efforts. From April 1971, India trained and armed the Mukti Bahini, a guerrilla resistance movement, through Operation Jackpot, enabling them to disrupt Pakistani operations. Indira Gandhi also launched a global diplomatic campaign, touring Europe and the United States to highlight Pakistan's atrocities and secure international support. When Pakistan preemptively attacked Indian airbases on December 3, 1971, through Operation Chengiz Khan, India declared war, launching a three-pronged offensive across land, air, and sea. The war, lasting just 13 days, culminated in the surrender of Pakistan's Eastern Command on December 16, 1971, in Dhaka, with Lieutenant General A.A.K. Niazi signing the Instrument of Surrender before Indian commander Jagjit Singh Aurora. This decisive victory birthed Bangladesh and established India as a dominant regional power, a feat that boosted Gandhi's domestic popularity and redefined South Asia's ideological map.

However, the Congress Party's recent invocation of this victory to critique Modi's Operation Sindoor-a 72-hour operation that targeted terror camps in Pakistan and disrupted its military infrastructure-has reignited debate about the long-term impact of 1971. Congress argues that Gandhi's leadership, which resisted U.S. pressure (notably the deployment of the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal) and secured Soviet support through the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, was a masterclass in asserting India's interests. In contrast, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) contends that Gandhi squandered a historic opportunity by failing to secure lasting strategic gains. The Simla Agreement of 1972, signed by Gandhi and Pakistan's Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, saw India release 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and return 13,000 square kilometres of captured land without resolving key issues like Kashmir or securing reparations for the refugee crisis. BJP leaders, including Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, argue that this was a "one-sided act of generosity" that failed to capitalise on India's military triumph.

The creation of Bangladesh, while a triumph for Bengali self-determination, has not been an unalloyed success for India. The refugee crisis, which Gandhi cited as a primary motivation, persists in various forms, with ongoing migration across the India-Bangladesh border fuelling tensions. Moreover, the liberation war gave Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and military establishment an enduring grievance, intensifying their resolve to contest Kashmir and view Bangladesh's independence as a loss of influence. Bangladesh itself has navigated a complex love-hate relationship with India. While it benefitted immensely from India's support during the liberation war and shares deep cultural and economic ties, recent years have seen a rise in anti-India sentiments, driven by disputes over water sharing (notably the Teesta River), border issues, and perceptions of Indian political interference. The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, the Nobel laureate and founder of Grameen Bank, has further complicated this dynamic by aligning closer to China, India's regional rival, which boasts a five-times-larger economy and seeks to counter India's influence in South Asia.

China's growing presence in Bangladesh, alongside its alliances with Pakistan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, has raised concerns in India about an emerging anti-India axis. Posts on X highlight fears of coordinated efforts to destabilise India's northeastern states and promote concepts like "Greater Bangladesh", which include claims on Indian territories like Bihar and Jharkhand. These sentiments are compounded by Bangladesh's interim government's response to Modi's Vijay Diwas message on December 16, 2024, which celebrated India's 1971 victory but omitted mention of Bangladesh's role, prompting leaders like Asif Nazrul and Hasnat Abdullah to condemn it as a threat to Bangladesh's sovereignty. Such reactions underscore the delicate balance India must navigate in asserting its historical contributions while respecting Bangladesh's national pride.

The 1971 war also raises a provocative counterfactual: could India have annexed East Pakistan, merging it with West Bengal as it did with Sikkim in 1975? Such a move might have expanded India's access to natural resources, including water, and strengthened its strategic position. However, Gandhi's decision to support Bangladesh's independence rather than annexation was driven by a mix of humanitarian and strategic considerations, including avoiding international backlash and fostering a friendly neighbour. Critics argue that this choice, while principled, left Bangladesh free to drift from India's orbit, as evidenced by its growing ties with China and occasional anti-India rhetoric. The Congress Party's current narrative, emphasising Gandhi's role in "breaking Pakistan into two", overlooks these complexities, framing 1971 as a singular triumph.

The debate over 1971 versus Operation Sindoor reflects deeper questions about India's strategic priorities and historical memory. While Gandhi's intervention addressed an immediate humanitarian crisis and weakened Pakistan, it did not resolve long-term challenges like border disputes or regional rivalries. Modi's Operation Sindoor, described as a targeted strike against terrorism, demonstrates India's willingness to act decisively in a nuclear-armed context, a feat the BJP claims surpasses the challenges of 1971, when Pakistan lacked nuclear capabilities. Yet, the Congress Party's invocation of Gandhi's legacy highlights a nostalgia for a time when India's actions reshaped the subcontinent, even if the outcomes were not entirely in its favour.

Ultimately, the legacy of 1971 is a tapestry of triumph and cautionary lessons. Indira Gandhi's leadership delivered a historic victory, liberating Bangladesh and asserting India's regional dominance. Yet, the enduring refugee issue, Pakistan's lingering resentment, and Bangladesh's complex relationship with India reveal the limits of military intervention in securing lasting strategic gains. As India navigates its rivalry with China and tensions with neighbours, the lessons of 1971 remind us that decisive action must be paired with strategic foresight. The Congress Party's attempt to elevate Gandhi's achievement over Modi's recent successes may resonate politically, but it risks oversimplifying a history that continues to shape South Asia's fraught geopolitical landscape.