New signals from Dhaka

The outcome of the just-concluded general election in Bangladesh, which has resulted in a decisive victory for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Tarique Rahman, marks a significant, but complex to a certain extent, turning point in India-Bangladesh relations. Bilateral relations between New Delhi and Dhaka had plunged to a historic low in the wake of the unceremonious ouster of pro-India Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. This election thus represents a forced reset, underlining the need for New Delhi to shift from a party-centric alliance to dealing with a traditional opponent in a volatile political landscape. A section of global political analysts consider the outcome as not only a political watershed for the South Asian nation but also a potential recalibration of regional power dynamics across India, Pakistan and China. Taking a closer look from Guwahati, one finds that the latest political transition in Bangladesh holds profound implications for the security, economy, and social fabric of Northeast India. With Bangladesh shifting away from the “golden era” of bilateral cooperation under the erstwhile Awami League regime, the Northeastern states—especially Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram, which share an international boundary with the neighbouring country—face a period of recalibration and potential volatility. The first and foremost concern for the Northeast is the potential weakening of security cooperation. During the Hasina government, Dhaka had actively clamped down on anti-India insurgent groups operating from the soil of that country. With the return of the BNP, there is every reason to fear a resurgence of some of these dormant militant groups.  India’s focus is on capability and intent, specifically on the new Bangladesh government cooperating on issues like border control and infiltration and maintaining the balance of power in the South Asia region.  Since such regimes have been in the past accused of harbouring insurgents and facilitating activities detrimental to India’s interests, one cannot refrain from raising fears of renewed instability in the region. Furthermore, during the instability in Bangladesh after the ouster of Hasina, there were as many as 1,000 infiltration attempts into the Northeast and West Bengal, a trend that poses a significant challenge to border security along the 4,000 km frontier.  With Islamist fundamental forces gaining ground in Bangladesh in the past eighteen months, threats have been issued almost on a regular basis, causing disturbances in the Northeast, with at least one prominent person in Dhaka even threatening to disrupt communication between the region and the rest of India through the Siliguri Corridor. No wonder, New Delhi recently announced a plan to construct a strategic 35.76-km underground railway link through the Corridor in order to provide secure, all-weather, and non-visible connectivity. This project aims to fortify the vulnerable 22-kilometer-wide stretch—which is bordered by Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan—against security threats and ensure uninterrupted logistics for defence and economic purposes. Also, the Northeastern region is heavily dependent on several transit routes through Bangladesh to connect with the rest of India and Southeast Asia. Projects like the Akhaura-Agartala rail link, which had given a big boost to trade and connectivity, could face slowdowns or renegotiations under the new regime. The economic ties, including the supply of electric power from Tripura to Bangladesh, may call for a reassessment. If the new government prioritizes economic ties with China and Pakistan, it could alter the regional balance of power, forcing India to accelerate alternative infrastructure projects, such as those through Myanmar.  Mention must also be made of the fact that unrest in Bangladesh had often led to migration, which historically caused demographic tensions in Assam, Tripura, and Meghalaya. Concerns about the safety of the Hindu community in Bangladesh have also resonated across the border, creating anxiety among ethnic communities about their cultural identity, land, and political representation. While the BNP has tried to reassure India about security, the transition marks a shift from a trusted ally to a more pragmatic, potentially challenging neighbour. For the Northeast, this means navigating heightened border risks, navigating potential economic hurdles, and maintaining strict vigilance, even as India attempts to build a new, stable relationship with the BNP-led government. Tarique Rahman is the 60-year-old son of former Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman (assassinated in 1981) and former multiple-time Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. He had left Bangladesh in 2017 after being arrested by a military-backed caretaker government on charges of corruption and money laundering. Living in London, he had continued to guide BNP strategy and was an influential decision-maker of the party. He studied at BAF Shaheen College and then at the University of Dhaka, where he pursued law and international relations. He later took to business in textiles and shipping. Entering politics in 1988, he had held important positions in the BNP, becoming senior joint secretary general and later acting party chief when Khaleda Zia’s imprisonment and failing health kept her away from active politics.