SCO Summit and Modi’s strategic dance with Russia and China

The recently concluded Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin, China, from August 31 to September 1, 2025, served as a vibrant stage for geopolitical theatre
SCO Summit
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Chandan Kumar Nath

(chandankumarnath7236@gmail.com)

The recently concluded Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin, China, from August 31 to September 1, 2025, served as a vibrant stage for geopolitical theatre, with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at its centre, skilfully navigating India’s complex relationships with Russia and China. The summit, hosted by Chinese President Xi Jinping and attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin, among other global leaders, was not just a routine diplomatic gathering but a significant moment in the evolving dynamics of a multipolar world order. Against the backdrop of U.S. tariffs and global trade tensions, Modi’s engagements with Xi and Putin underscored India’s strategic balancing act, reinforcing its enduring ties with Russia while cautiously warming relations with China. 

The SCO, founded in 2001 by China, Russia, and four Central Asian states, has grown into a formidable regional bloc, encompassing 10 member states, including India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus, and representing nearly 43% of the world’s population and a quarter of the global economy. The 2025 Tianjin Summit, described by Chinese officials as the largest in the organisation’s history, brought together over 20 world leaders and representatives from 10 international organizations, including the United Nations and ASEAN. The event was a showcase of Beijing’s ambition to position itself as a counterweight to U.S.-led Western alliances, with Xi advocating for a “new global security and economic order” prioritising the Global South. For India, the summit offered a platform to assert its role as a regional power while navigating the pressures of U.S. sanctions and its own strategic priorities.

Modi’s visit to Tianjin was his first to China in seven years, a significant marker given the fraught history of India-China relations following the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes. The bilateral meeting between Modi and Xi on August 31 was a focal point of the summit, signalling a tentative thaw in ties. The leaders, meeting for the first time since the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024, expressed a mutual desire to move beyond the border disputes that have long strained their relationship. Xi emphasized that China and India should be “partners, not rivals”, advocating for a relationship driven by economic cooperation rather than territorial conflicts. Modi echoed this sentiment, noting an “atmosphere of peace and stability” along the border and announcing the resumption of direct flights between the two nations, which had been suspended since the 2020 clashes. This gesture, while symbolic, reflects a broader effort to normalise ties, spurred in part by recent agreements to restore border trade and ensure peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The backdrop of U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade policies loomed large over the summit. Trump’s imposition of 50% tariffs on Indian goods, primarily as a response to India’s continued purchase of Russian oil, has strained India-U.S. relations, pushing New Delhi closer to Beijing and Moscow. Modi’s interactions with Xi were framed by this economic pressure, with both leaders acknowledging the shared responsibility of their populous nations to stabilise the fragile global economy. The Tianjin Declaration, adopted by SCO members, underscored this economic focus, with Xi proposing a new SCO development bank and offering 2 billion yuan in aid and 10 billion yuan in loans to member states. For India, which has historically been cautious about China’s Belt and Road Initiative, reaffirmed by all SCO members except India at the summit, these economic overtures present both opportunities and challenges. Modi’s emphasis on fostering regional cooperation under the SCO umbrella, as noted by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, suggests India’s intent to engage selectively while safeguarding its strategic autonomy. If Modi’s meeting with Xi was a step toward cautious reconciliation, his interactions with Putin were a reaffirmation of a deep and enduring partnership. The India-Russia relationship, described by Modi as one where both nations “stand shoulder to shoulder even in the most difficult situations”, was on vivid display at the summit. A striking moment came when Modi and Putin shared a ride in the Russian president’s armoured Aurus limousine to their bilateral meeting, a gesture that captured global attention.Their nearly hour-long discussion covered a wide range of issues, from trade and fertilisers to space, security, and culture, with Modi highlighting the upcoming 15th anniversary of the India-Russia Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.

The Ukraine conflict was a key topic in their talks, with Modi reiterating India’s support for peace efforts. Putin, in turn, praised India’s role, alongside China, in facilitating potential resolutions to the crisis, while deflecting blame onto Western interference and NATO’s expansion. This alignment on Ukraine, coupled with Putin’s public dismissal of U.S. claims that the conflict was “Modi’s war”, highlighted the strategic convergence between New Delhi and Moscow. Russia’s announcement of new investment projects with India and China, as noted by Kirill Dmitriev, CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, further cements this economic partnership. India’s reliance on Russian oil, which has grown despite U.S. tariffs, underscores the pragmatic nature of this relationship, with both nations prioritising mutual economic benefits over Western pressure.

The optics of Modi’s interactions with Xi and Putin – a viral photograph of the three leaders smiling and clasping hands – projected an image of unity that belied underlying tensions. While the SCO Summit was billed as a showcase of a trilateral axis, India’s position remains distinct. Unlike China and Russia, which openly advocate for a multipolar order to counter U.S. dominance, India envisions a multipolarity where influence is distributed more evenly, without any single power dominating. This divergence was evident in Modi’s absence from China’s grand military parade on September 3, 2025, commemorating the 80th anniversary of World War II’s end. The parade, attended by Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, was a display of China’s military might and its alignment with Russia and other authoritarian regimes. Modi’s decision to return to India before the event was a deliberate signal of New Delhi’s reluctance to fully align with this bloc, particularly in light of its growing ties with Japan, a key U.S. ally.

India’s careful choreography at the summit reflects its broader foreign policy of strategic autonomy. Modi’s address to the SCO plenary session emphasized the fight against terrorism as a collective challenge, with a pointed reference to the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam terror attack in India, which killed 26 civilians. The Tianjin Declaration echoed this stance, condemning terrorism and calling for accountability for perpetrators and sponsors of cross-border attacks. However, India’s refusal to sign an earlier SCO joint declaration due to its omission of the Pahalgam attack highlights the challenges of navigating a bloc that includes Pakistan, a nation India accuses of supporting terrorism. China’s refusal to explicitly name Pakistan in its condemnation of the attack, instead equating it with attacks in Pakistan, underscores the delicate balance India must strike within the SCO.

The summit also highlighted India’s broader regional strategy. Modi’s proposal for a Civilisational Dialogue Forum within the SCO reflects India’s ambition to foster cultural and people-to-people ties, positioning itself as a leader in soft power diplomacy. Yet, the presence of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and the participation of observer states like Turkey and Myanmar added layers of complexity. India’s strained relations with Pakistan and its cautious engagement with China’s regional allies, such as Myanmar’s military junta, underscore the limits of SCO unity. Moreover, the summit’s focus on security, including new centres to tackle organized crime and cybersecurity, aligns with India’s priorities but also raises questions about how far New Delhi can align with Beijing’s vision without compromising its strategic interests.

The SCO Summit in Tianjin was a microcosm of the global shifts reshaping international relations. For Modi, it was an opportunity to reinforce India’s indispensable role in a multipolar world, balancing ties with Russia and China while maintaining strategic flexibility. The warm optics with Putin and the cautious optimism with Xi reflect India’s pragmatic approach to diplomacy in an era of uncertainty. As U.S. tariffs and global trade wars intensify, India’s ability to navigate these relationships will be critical. The summit may not have resolved the underlying tensions between India, China, and Russia, but it underscored Modi’s diplomatic dexterity in keeping India’s options open. As the world watches the fallout from Tianjin, one thing is clear: India’s strategic dance with its Eurasian partners is far from over, and Modi’s steps will shape the contours of Asia’s geopolitical future.

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