Self-radicalisation & the Doval doctrine

The shift toward self‑radicalisation – where actors, often with little or no formal affiliation to established organisations, are propelled

into violent fanaticism through a blend of online propaganda, personal grievance and algorithmic reinforcement – poses a qualitatively changed challenge to the Indian state – Jaideep Saikia

The spectre of radical Islam has been a feature in India’s security calculus for decades. However, the terrain of threat is currently undergoing a profound transformation. Whereas the idiom of terror in the past was anchored in discernible structures, territorial sanctuaries and hierarchical command-and-control cut-outs, the contemporary wave is characterised by an increasingly atomised, self‑directed singularity.

The shift toward self‑radicalisation — where actors, often with little or no formal affiliation to established organisations, are propelled into violent fanaticism through a blend of online propaganda, personal grievance and algorithmic reinforcement—poses a qualitatively changed challenge to the Indian state. The danger mandates not only a recalibration of operational tactics but also a fundamental re‑examination of the strategic policy that has been guiding counter‑terrorism policy under the Doval Doctrine. This has become even more imperative as it is being seen that the internal intelligence mechanism of India has not been able to internalise the sophistication of the Doval Doctrine. Consequently, the struggle to adapt to an amorphous, digitally‑facilitated threat underscores a widening gap between strategic intent and institutional ineptitude.

The last decade has witnessed a measurable erosion of the traditional “group‑centric” model that once defined Islamist militancy in South Asia. Intelligence assessments now point to a surge in lone‑actor attacks, online manifestoes and encrypted messaging networks that operate beyond the reach of conventional surveillance. It has been reported that over 75% of the actors implicated in Islamist‑related violence since 2022 had no prior affiliation with recognised outfits such as the Laskar‑e‑Toiba or the Jaish-e-Mohammad. Instead, their radicalisation trajectories were shaped by a confluence of factors, including algorithmic amplification of extremist content, personal instances of “perceived wrongs”, and the effortlessness of accessing operational manuals by accessing dark sites.

Such an atomisation is augmented by the spread of generative artificial intelligence tools. Deepfake videos, AI‑generated false belief systems and automated chatbots are serving both as operational enablers and recruitment accelerants.

Doval’s strategic position, often condensed in the phrase “offensive-defence”, has been the cornerstone of India’s counter‑terrorism posture for over a decade. Its central tenets include (a) proactive disruption of terrorist financing networks, (b) deployment of covert, kinetic and non‑kinetic measures in order to neutralise state sponsoring of terrorism, (c) combination of diplomacy, intelligence and economic tools within a centrist framework, and (d) the forming of a deterrent posture that combines conventional aptitude with evolving technologies. However, the only reason that it was not able to realise an articulation was because of the insouciant delivery mechanism that such a robust mandate was entrusted to, at least during the last over three years since July 1, 2022.

The novel Doval Doctrine must correct this flaw and formalise a “predictive‑prevention paradigm”. This entails moving beyond the reactionary disruption of known networks to a methodical identification of actors who exhibit primary behavioural radicalisation markers.

The doctrine must embrace an “all-embracing approach” that leverages non‑state actors—community organisations, educational establishments and industrial firms—as strategic partners. The traditional state‑centric model, which relies almost entirely on intelligence and law‑enforcement agencies, is ill‑suited to addressing a threat that sprouts in the private domain. By institutionalising mechanisms for rapid information sharing with trusted civil‑society actors, the doctrine can create a “social‑immune system” capable of detecting and neutralising radicalisation at its embryonic stages.

Despite the strategic clarity offered by the Doval Doctrine, the Indian internal intelligence has not demonstrated the capability to comprehend its out-of-the-box nuances, particularly as they pertain to self‑radicalisation, which the Islamic State’s closing days in Iraq and Syria had heralded by way of a plethora of lone-wolf attacks. Institutional inertia, a legacy of hierarchical analysis and a risk‑loath culture have collectively impeded the internal intelligence agency’s capacity to shift from a “group‑focused” mindset to one that can grapple with an unstructured, digitally‑facilitated menace.

The internal intelligence agency’s analytical framework remains anchored in the identification of organisational hierarchies, funding streams and logistical footprints—metrics that are largely irrelevant to lone actors who operate without a formal command-and-control chain. Misinterpretation of the Doval Doctrine’s intrinsic sophistication was blatantly illustrated in the aftermath of the November 10, 2025, Red Fort suicide bombing incident, where intelligence inputs indicated that the perpetrator had been “detected” by an AI‑based monitoring system for usage of extremist language. Yet the alert was dismissed as “low‑priority” by analysts habituated to assessing threats through the lens of established outfits. The failure to act on such early warnings underlines a fundamental disconnect between the internal intelligence agency’s operational doctrine and the emerging reality of self‑radicalisation.

The internal intelligence’s inability to grasp the elegance of the Doval Doctrine is not merely an operational shortfall; it represents a strategic vulnerability for a country that has already felt the heavy hand of terror for decades. The doctrine’s emphasis on an “offensive-defence”, where the state anticipates, disrupts and deters, necessitates a full-bodied intelligence apparatus that can operate in a proactive, network‑dispersed manner.

The clear and present danger that the self-radicalisation poses lurks in forgotten mohallas, quiet cafeterias and dingy hostel rooms, many of which, now coming to light, are manned by highly educated and motivated actors. It is also important to comprehend that the phenomenon of self-radicalisation (or radicalisation itself!) can well be shorn of a puritanical reading of Islamic tenets. It could present itself to deviant minds on the prowl for maniacal outlets as well as actors who are convinced by isolated, remote incidents that a Quam is in danger and has to, therefore, be protected by recourse to all means, including massive violence.

The present state architecture that enforces national security in India, however, remains entrenched in a reactive posture, privileging the accumulation of evidence over the generation of foresight. Until the internal intelligence agency embraces a doctrinal shift that correctly mirrors Doval’s vision—one that places predictive analytics, digital countermeasures and community engagement in the forefront—its relevance to the evolving threat landscape will continue to remain peripheral. Such a swing will necessitate a top-down revolution, including an obvious change of the Jurassic mindset that heads the agency. Indeed, it is the head that presently ails an otherwise wholesome physique. The body can be rescued if a swift change of guard is undertaken. After all, the agency had earlier been headed by colossuses such as B.N. Mullick, Atma Jayaram, P.C. Haldar, Syed Asif Ibrahim and Ajit Doval himself. The unfortunate aberration of the present needs immediate course correction. Much of the plot has already been lost as a result of inordinate delay.

India can successfully align its doctrinal vision with an agile, data‑informed intelligence apparatus. This will not only neutralise the immediate danger of self‑radicalised violence but also fortify its broader national security arc against amorphous threats. The stakes are high, and the window for action is gradually narrowing.

India must seize the moment to transform the revolutionary Doval Doctrine, which is one of its only kinds in a world traumatised by terror-wrecked waters, into spirited action. The enabling curve should be to refurbish the enfeeblement that a self-serving internal intelligence head has reduced the country to.

The new crop of bold warriors—on taking up their calling—their countrymen are certain, will certainly comprehend the Doval mandate in its entirety, which current zookeepers have failed to fathom and live up to. The pioneering policies of the High Czar will then be swift and result-orientated, transforming the current debilitation into the meteoric advantage of victory.

(Jaideep Saikia is an internationally celebrated strategic thinker and bestselling author. He can be reached at jdpsaikia@gmail.com.)