SIR and the constitutional balance between electoral purity and inclusion

Bivash Modi

(modi.bivash@yahoo.in)

The Election Commission of India’s (ECI) Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has become a political and constitutional flashpoint. Yet beneath the rhetoric lies a straightforward question: can India clean its electoral rolls without disenfranchising a genuine elector?

The answer lies neither in unquestioning institutional fa2ith nor in assuming mala fides. It lies in the Constitution, statute, evidence and procedural fairness.

SIR is not a new phenomenon

SIR is not an innovation of the present ECI. Electoral rolls have historically undergone Intensive Revision, Summary Revision and Special Revision, besides continuous updating. The ECI records show intensive revisions in several states in 2002-03. Bihar last underwent an intensive revision in 2003; the present exercise was ordered in June 2025, with the ECI citing urbanisation, migration, non-reporting of deaths and duplication as reasons for re-verification.

The distinction between SIR and Summary Revision (SR) is essentially procedural. Intensive revision involves extensive verification, traditionally including house-to-house enumeration; summary revision proceeds principally from the existing roll and invites claims and objections.

Sections 21 to 24 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 provide the statutory framework for preparation, revision, correction, deletion and inclusion. Thus, addition and deletion are normal incidents of maintaining an electoral roll. The real legal question is not whether a name can be deleted, but whether it is deleted lawfully and after proper verification.

Constitutional power

Article 324 entrusts the ECI with superintendence, direction and control of elections and electoral rolls. Article 325 mandates one general electoral roll and prohibits exclusion on specified discriminatory grounds. Article 326 establishes adult suffrage subject to constitutional and statutory qualifications.

In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978), the Supreme Court recognised the amplitude of Article 324. But A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai (1984) established an equally important limitation: constitutional power cannot be exercised contrary to legislation occupying the field.

The Supreme Court’s May 2026 judgement in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India upheld Bihar’s SIR, stating that it was traceable to Article 324 in conjunction with Section 21(3) of the 1950 Act, pursued a legitimate electoral objective, and met both proportionality and procedural requirements. The Court also held that the ECI may undertake a limited inquiry into citizenship for determining electoral eligibility. The judgement, therefore, cannot reasonably be read as a carte blanche for the ECI. Nor does it establish that every exclusion is necessarily correct.

Existing enrolment is important, but not immutable

In Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer (1995), the court recognised the evidentiary significance of a person’s existing entry in the electoral roll. Earlier jurisprudence, including Inderjit Barua v. Election Commission of India (1985), also recognised the importance of electoral-roll enrolment. But existing enrolment cannot become an irrevocable vested right against lawful revision. A dead, permanently shifted or duplicate entry cannot remain forever merely because it was once valid. The constitutional balance is therefore clear: purification of the roll and protection of the elector must operate together.

Forms 6, 7 and 8: where the controversy begins 

The system itself recognises continuous correction. Form 6 is for inclusion of a new elector; Form 7 for objection or deletion; and Form 8 for shifting residence, correction and other modifications.

The additional declaration associated with Form 6 during SIR has generated controversy because it raises a legitimate administrative-law question: can an electronic interface create an additional evidentiary requirement that is not contained in the statutory form or rules?

The ECI maintains that Form 6 itself was not altered and that a separate declaration was added to the SIR process. The controversy is now before the Supreme Court; on October 5, 2026, the Chief Justice clarified that the Court had not approved any “modified Form 6. “Technology may facilitate the law. It cannot become a substitute for the law. What do the numbers actually establish?

The Bihar exercise illustrates why statistics require context. The ECI’s June 2025 order recorded an electorate of nearly 7.89 crore and the need to eliminate dead, shifted, absentee and duplicate entries.

Large numbers subsequently absent from draft rolls were widely described politically as “deleted voters”. That description can be misleading. Absence from a draft roll does not by itself establish cancellation of citizenship or final disenfranchisement. Equally, it would be complacent to presume that every exclusion is correct. The decisive safeguards are therefore claims, objections, notice, hearing, speaking orders and appeals. The ECI itself directed that no name be deleted from Bihar’s draft roll without enquiry, a speaking order and a fair and reasonable opportunity.

Dissent inside the ECI

The current controversy over disagreement within the Commission deserves a measured reading. Section 18(2) of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023, says that business should, as far as possible, be transacted unanimously; where the Commissioners differ, the matter is decided by majority. Reports have said the two election commissioners recorded objections on at least 14 occasions between late 2025 and 2026. The ECI says the observations were part of deliberation and that the final decisions were unanimous.

There is, however, no publicly established aggregate figure showing how many total matters before the present Commission were unanimous and how many were decided by a majority. The legally relevant question is whether every disputed decision ultimately complied with Section 18. Dissent is not institutional failure. Dissent followed by a lawful majority decision is itself constitutional decision-making.

Should judges and lawyers exercise restraint?

This question has acquired immediacy.One of the sitting judges in the Supreme Court recently spoke publicly about the constitutional danger of wholesale disenfranchisement and the importance of hearing before deletion. He did not expressly name SIR or the ECI. Yet the remarks came amid pending litigation. Former CJI B.R. Gavai subsequently said that judicial propriety would not permit a sitting judge to comment on a matter sub judice before the Court. Judicial independence permits dissent; indeed, dissent within a judgement strengthens constitutional democracy. But public observations by a sitting judge on a pending controversy may, however unintentionally, create an impression of a pre-formed judicial view or influence colleagues. The same principle of restraint should apply to counsel. During the October 5 hearing on a plea seeking action against CEC Gyanesh Kumar, Senior Advocate Vikas Singh urged interim intervention, saying, “Otherwise the country will burn.” The Bench insisted on hearing the respondents first before issuing an ex-parte order. A lawyer represents a client before the court; he does not possess a constitutional mandate to speak for 140 crore Indians. The courtroom is governed by law, not by the anticipated temperature of the street.

Streetocracy cannot replace constitutionalism

Peaceful protest is democratic. But no constitutional authority should be compelled to decide by street pressure. Nor should the ECI be immune from scrutiny. Former judges and public intellectuals have a legitimate role in constitutional discourse, but repeating unverified figures from partisan media ecosystems can unintentionally lend judicial credibility to untested claims.

Political Vendetta

The reopening of a 2006 Kerala vigilance matter involving Gyanesh Kumar serves as a pertinent example. The State has ordered examination of an old road-project investigation; reports indicate that the earlier inquiry had been closed for lack of evidence. The revival’s justification or political motivation is ostensibly a matter of vendetta. It erodes the credibility of the government.

The constitutional middle path

Senior Advocate Harish Salve has also stressed the distinction between proof of identity, citizenship and electoral eligibility. That distinction is legally important: the ECI determines eligibility for electoral registration; it is not a general citizenship tribunal. The Supreme Court’s 2026 judgement similarly confined the ECI’s inquiry to electoral eligibility rather than final adjudication of citizenship.

India therefore needs neither blind trust nor jaundiced suspicion. An electoral roll must be clean enough to prevent wrongful inclusion.

The governing principle should be: Verify rigorously.  Delete lawfully. Hear fairly. Restore promptly. 

Democracy is not strengthened when constitutional institutions become immune from criticism. Nor is it strengthened when criticism substitutes allegation for evidence. The ultimate test of SIR must therefore be based on the Constitution, the Representation of the People Act, the Rules, the evidence, and procedural fairness.

That is the difference between democracy as a contest of political narratives and democracy as constitutional government.