Tectonic shifts in Manipur

Jaideep Saikia

(jdpsaikia@gmail.com)

The brutal execution of six Naga men by Kuki insurgents earlier this month has shattered the delicate triad that historically defined Manipur. By driving the Nagas into a strategic alliance with the Meiteis under the banner of the Native Peoples’ Committee Manipur (NPCM), the development marks the beginning of a geo-strategic realignment of the state’s embattled landscape.

The growing alliance between Manipur’s two largest native groups against the Kuki insurgents has serious and lasting effects on the safety, governance, and land stability of Manipur and the surrounding areas. It has signalled not only a triadic collapse but also an intriguing strategic configuration.

The immediate physical consequence of the Naga-Meitei alliance is the total geographic encirclement of the Kuki-dominated territories. Historically, the Meitei-Kuki conflict was confined to the friction points between the central Imphal Valley and the surrounding hills. The Nagas, occupying the vast northern and western hill districts such as Ukhrul, Senapati, and Tamenglong, had acted as a massive physical buffer. But recent events seem to have restructured the narrative.

With the formation of the NPCM and possible coordinated operations between the United Naga Council (UNC) and the Valley-based Insurgent Groups (the latter, according to latest information, have not made any statements to the effect), the aforesaid buffer has transformed into a strategic perimeter. Kuki-Zo populations concentrated in districts like Churachandpur and parts of Kangpokpi now face a consolidated front on all sides. This geographic isolation severely restricts the logistical manoeuvrability of Kuki armed groups, cutting off informal transit routes and altering the balance of ground-level friction.

For decades, the central geopolitical ambition of the Kuki political and insurgent groups has been the creation of a separate state or administrative unit, “Kukiland” or a separate administration, carved out of the hill areas of Manipur. This demand was heavily contingent on the premise that the hills were unified in their distinct political identity in opposition to the Valley. The new Naga-Meitei convergence completely disrupts the plot.

Nagas and Kukis have deep-seated, historically volatile disputes over vast swathes of land in districts like Kangpokpi and Chandel. By joining the Meiteis to assert shared “native” indigeneity, the Nagas have explicitly rejected any pan-tribal hill solidarity with the Kukis. The Naga community’s formal alignment ensures that any administrative partition of Manipur’s hills is a political dead end. New Delhi cannot grant territorial concessions to Kuki factions without directly triggering an armed uprising from a unified Naga-Meitei front determined to protect the historic map of the state.

The alliance has also weaponised the combined political leverage to target the institutional pillars that have governed the region’s security for nearly two decades. The joint demand by the Naga Students’ Federation (NSF) and the Meitei Civil Society Organisations for the immediate abrogation of the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement places New Delhi in a difficult policy bind.

To be sure, the SoO was an unofficial arrangement that the Assam Rifles had with Kuki insurgent organisations in Manipur. It was on 13 May 2008 that moves were made to systematise the earlier orchestration when the author pointed out its informal nature in the annual Assam Rifles Commanders’ Conference in Shillong, where he was the sole civilian making a security presentation. The then union home minister, Shivraj Patil, was present on the occasion.

However, the intervention by the author in the aforesaid conference was only to buttress the ad hoc manner in which the Assam Rifles had got into an agreement with the Kuki formations prior to the formalisation on 22 August 2008. There was never any doubt in the mind of the author in 2008, nor is there any now, in 2026, that the Assam Rifles are perhaps one of the noblest and most neutral of forces that is operating in the North East. Sundry accusations, including the current NPCM demand to withdraw the Assam Rifles, are without any basis and are tantamount to unfairly sullying the reputation of a force that has served the region without fear or favour.

But to return to the realignment account within Manipur, it has to be understood that it is not localised. It threatens to destabilise the wider ethno-political balance across Northeast India and Myanmar. Unless New Delhi is careful, the conflict now risks polarising neighbouring states into a proxy confrontation:

The brutal nature of the June executions has deeply angered the public in Nagaland. Powerful bodies like the Naga Hoho and NSF are actively mobilising, as has reportedly the Church from outside the confines of both Manipur and Nagaland. The political leadership in Kohima is under intense pressure to back their brethren in Manipur, potentially drawing northern insurgent factions into the fray. This is a clear departure from the narrative that the author was witness to when he delivered and later interacted with over 200 college students of Nagaland on 16 September 2023 in the Captain N. Kenguruse Hall in Kohima.

It is recalled that the author had demanded to know from his audience, “Tell me, how many of you are desirous of a greater Nagalim that encompasses parts of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Manipur?” And how many of you are content with the present territory of Nagaland?” It was a moment of both silence and truth for the audience. But the interface irrefutably stated that the youth of Nagaland are happy with the present-day territory of Nagaland. Tired of the “longest-running insurgency” and the peace dialogue that was not getting anywhere, the new generation of Nagaland wanted to forge ahead as proud stakeholders and partners in India’s nation-building exercise. While researching for the article, the author experienced a moment of despair. What if the joyful comprehension of 16 September 2023 has changed? It is argued that a handful of Kukis queering the pitch must be resisted by the Indian state, and immediately.

Kuki-Zo groups share deep transnational ethnic ties with the Chin people of Myanmar and the Mizo people of Mizoram. Greater pressure on the Kuki population in Manipur will inevitably cause political ripples in Aizawl and alter the operational calculations of Chin resistance groups operating along the Indo-Myanmar border.

Faced with total domestic political isolation and a combined Naga-Meitei front, Kuki insurgent factions may transition away from standard territorial holdout tactics. Certain observers fear that a shift toward hyper-asymmetrical warfare, characterised by heightened disruption of Manipur’s lifelines, specifically NH-2 and NH-37, which pass through highly volatile, ethnically fragmented corridors, as well as further cross-border belligerence, could be on the cards. The author was clear from both his earlier travels to Manipur, especially after the unrest of 3 May 2023, that the Kukis have an upper hand when it comes to a war arsenal, including drones and sophisticated weaponry that have entered Manipur from Myanmar.

The coming together of the Nagas and Meiteis has effectively ended the era of localised, low-intensity ethnic policing in Manipur. By framing the crisis not as a hill-versus-valley dispute but as a defence of historical indigenes against external demographic threats, the NPCM has fundamentally altered the rules of engagement.

For New Delhi, the old policy of managing the crisis through containment and balancing ethnic factions is no longer viable. The state is now cleanly divided into two highly armed, ideologically consolidated blocs. New Delhi must either rapidly execute an impartial federal enforcement operation—beginning with the prosecution of the perpetrators behind the heinous Naga executions—or risk watching the entire frontier slide into a wider regional war.