The new geography of power: India’s quest for mineral sovereignty

Debika Dutta

(debika.dutta2015@gmail.com)

Political independence does not automatically confer economic sovereignty, just as economic growth does not necessarily guarantee technological independence. A nation may possess considerable military strength, an expanding economy and an influential diplomatic presence, yet remain vulnerable if the essential materials sustaining its industrial and technological ambitions are controlled elsewhere. This is the strategic contradiction confronting much of the contemporary world, and India cannot afford to underestimate it. Lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earth elements have emerged from the margins of industrial economics to occupy the centre of geopolitical competition. They are indispensable to electric mobility, advanced electronics, renewable energy infrastructure, telecommunications, aerospace and modern defence systems. The struggle over these resources is consequently not just about access to minerals; it is about who will possess the capacity to shape the technological and industrial order of the coming decades.

The geography of power is changing, but the underlying contest for control remains familiar. Coal determined the industrial ascendancy of earlier powers, petroleum shaped the strategic calculations of the twentieth century, and critical minerals are becoming equally consequential in the emerging technological age. What distinguishes the present competition is the concentration of processing and refining capabilities in a relatively small number of countries. Possessing mineral deposits does not necessarily confer control over the industries that depend upon them. The real advantage belongs to those who can explore, extract, refine, engineer and manufacture. A country may have natural resources beneath its soil and still remain dependent on another for the materials required by its factories, infrastructure and defence establishments. This is precisely why mineral sovereignty must become an integral component of India’s national security and economic strategy.

India’s aspirations to emerge as a major manufacturing and technological power cannot be reconciled with excessive dependence on external sources for critical industrial inputs. The expansion of semiconductor manufacturing, electric mobility, renewable energy, advanced telecommunications and indigenous defence production requires reliable access to specialised materials. Disruptions in their supply can affect industrial output, increase production costs and compromise long-term technological plans. More seriously, concentrated supply chains create opportunities for geopolitical pressure. Export restrictions, trade disputes and strategic rivalries can transform an apparently commercial relationship into an instrument of influence. The lesson is unmistakable: economic dependence becomes a national vulnerability when a country lacks alternatives or the capacity to withstand external disruption.

India has begun responding to this challenge through a series of important policy interventions. The National Critical Mineral Mission, approved in January 2025, envisages government expenditure of Rs 16,300 crore, alongside an expected investment of Rs 18,000 crore from public sector undertakings and other stakeholders. Its objective is to strengthen the country’s capabilities across exploration, mining, processing, recycling and overseas acquisition of mineral assets. More recently, on 4 November 2026, the Union Cabinet approved a Rs 2,814-crore capital support scheme to promote domestic lithium and nickel processing. The scheme provides for a 30 per cent capital subsidy towards establishing four processing plants and is expected to attract approximately Rs 10,000 crore in investment. These initiatives indicate an important recognition that the security of India’s industrial future cannot be left entirely to the uncertainties of international supply chains. However, policy recognition is only the beginning. The real measure of success will be the capacity to translate these decisions into productive, internationally competitive industrial capabilities.

There is a fundamental distinction between announcing self-reliance and building the capabilities that make it possible. India must not mistake the discovery of mineral deposits or the auctioning of mining blocks for the achievement of resource sovereignty. Exploration without commercially viable extraction, extraction without domestic processing, and processing without advanced manufacturing will leave the country with an incomplete industrial value chain. The danger is that India may become a supplier of raw materials while continuing to import the refined products and sophisticated technologies that generate the greatest economic value. Such an arrangement would reproduce dependency in a different form. The national objective must be to capture a substantially greater share of the value created at every stage, from geological exploration to the manufacture of finished products.

This requires a fundamental strengthening of India’s scientific and industrial ecosystem. Critical mineral processing is technologically demanding and cannot be developed through financial incentives alone. Research institutions, universities, engineering establishments and private enterprises must work together to develop indigenous technologies, improve recovery methods and establish internationally competitive processing capabilities. India needs sustained investment in material sciences, chemical engineering, battery technologies and advanced manufacturing. It must also encourage private industry to look beyond the immediate commercial returns of extraction and invest in research and technological innovation. A country that aspires to lead the next industrial transformation cannot remain satisfied with assembling products whose most consequential technologies and essential inputs originate elsewhere. Technological sovereignty begins when knowledge becomes productive national capacity.

Recycling deserves equal strategic attention. Discarded batteries, electronic equipment and industrial waste contain valuable materials that can be recovered and returned to productive use. As India’s consumption of electronic goods and battery-dependent technologies expands, the recovery of these materials will become an increasingly important source of domestic supply. A circular industrial economy would reduce pressure on fresh extraction, strengthen supply-chain resilience and limit environmental damage. It would also create opportunities for research, entrepreneurship and specialised employment. Treating valuable minerals as disposable waste would be an extraordinary failure of industrial foresight.

Yet resource security cannot become a justification for ecological indifference. Mining activities can place severe pressure on forests, biodiversity, water systems and the livelihoods of communities inhabiting mineral-bearing regions. Development that disregards these consequences may produce immediate economic gains while imposing costs that endure for generations. India’s mineral ambitions must therefore be guided by responsible extraction, transparent environmental assessments, technological safeguards and meaningful consultation with affected communities. The concerns of indigenous populations cannot be dismissed as administrative obstacles to industrial expansion. National development must create opportunities for the people whose land and environment are directly affected by it. Strategic sovereignty loses its moral legitimacy when its costs are systematically transferred to vulnerable communities.

Nor should mineral sovereignty be confused with economic isolation. India cannot realistically produce every critical mineral it requires. Diversified international partnerships with resource-rich countries in Africa, Latin America, Australia and other regions will remain essential. However, these relationships must extend beyond the purchase of raw materials to exploration, technology transfer, processing and industrial collaboration. India’s external economic engagement should seek durable partnerships based on mutual benefit rather than create new concentrations of dependence. Strategic autonomy does not mean withdrawing from global interdependence; it means possessing sufficient capabilities and alternatives to prevent interdependence from becoming coercion.

The Northeast must also find a meaningful place in this larger national vision. Its geographical position and connectivity with Southeast Asia give it significance beyond conventional regional development considerations. Infrastructure, scientific education, research institutions, skilled employment and responsible industrial investment can enable the region to participate more substantially in India’s evolving economic architecture. Its future should not be confined to the language of geographical remoteness or border management. The Northeast must be recognised as an integral participant in India’s economic transformation and its wider strategic engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

Ultimately, the contest over critical minerals is a contest over the distribution of power in the coming century. Earlier industrial transformations rewarded nations that mastered coal, iron and petroleum. The next will favour those capable of combining strategic resources with scientific knowledge, advanced processing and manufacturing excellence. India possesses considerable human talent, entrepreneurial energy and institutional capacity. What it requires is a sustained national commitment that transcends short-term commercial calculations and electoral cycles. Mineral security must be treated as a long-term strategic priority, supported by consistent policies, technological investment and responsible governance.

India cannot aspire to technological leadership while remaining structurally dependent on the materials that make its technologies possible. Nor can it claim comprehensive economic sovereignty if the most consequential stages of its industrial value chains remain beyond its control. The measure of a nation’s self-reliance is not how frequently it invokes the language of independence, but how effectively it develops the capabilities necessary to exercise that independence. The decisive question for India is no longer merely whether it possesses the resources of the future, but whether it possesses the determination, knowledge and industrial imagination to command their value. The next geography of global power is being shaped beneath the earth as much as across its political boundaries. India must ensure that it is not merely present in this emerging contest, but equipped to shape its outcome.