Unfinished battle against infiltration in Kashmir

Dipak Kurmi

(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com.)

In the aftermath of the brutal massacre of 26 tourists at Baisaran, a picturesque meadow near Pahalgam nestled in the embrace of the Pir Panjal mountains, India’s security forces are grappling with a grim reality. The five terrorists responsible for the carnage are believed to have melted into the dense jungles that sprawl over hundreds of kilometres of harsh and inaccessible terrain. This devastating incident has once again underscored the pressing need for a robust and impenetrable anti-infiltration grid along the India-Pakistan border, especially in the critical regions of Jammu and Kashmir.

India and Pakistan share a sprawling border stretching over 3,300 kilometres, with nearly 1,000 kilometres running through the volatile landscape of Jammu and Kashmir. This region has long been a flashpoint for cross-border infiltration and terrorist activity, making border security a matter of paramount national importance. The Pir Panjal’s thick forests, treacherous ridges, and poor visibility—where spotting movement beyond 100 metres is near impossible—create an ideal environment for terrorists to evade detection. Hunting them down in this formidable environment demands not just manpower but an extraordinary combination of technical surveillance and reliable human intelligence.

The scale of the challenge is staggering. Over the past several years, more than 50 Army personnel have lost their lives in fierce encounters with terrorists hidden within the jungles of Poonch, Rajouri, Kathua, and Doda. These losses highlight the brutal and asymmetric nature of jungle warfare, where well-trained infiltrators from Pakistan exploit the landscape to maximum advantage. Intelligence sources suggest that the perpetrators of the Pahalgam attack fit this profile: highly trained operatives, at least three of whom are believed to be Pakistani nationals, operating independently of local support networks, and equipped with sophisticated stealth communication devices that make tracking them exceedingly difficult.

The broader strategic lesson from these attacks is painfully clear: prevention is infinitely better than cure. As a senior security official succinctly put it, “Once a terrorist is in, it is not easy to hunt him down… So the idea should be to not let him enter in the first place.” Thus, an impregnable counter-infiltration grid becomes not merely a defensive measure but a crucial proactive strategy.

Over the years, data has proven the effectiveness of rigorous border management. Following the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan, India accelerated the construction of border fencing. Intelligence Bureau figures reveal a dramatic reduction in successful infiltration attempts: while more than half of all infiltration efforts were successful in 2002, by 2010, the success rate had dropped to merely one-fifth, with only 52 of 247 attempts succeeding. Compared to the 1990s, when infiltration was rampant, often running into thousands annually, the current figures—between 50 and 100 attempts each year—represent a significant achievement.

The success story, however, is far from complete. Despite near-complete fencing along the Line of Control (LoC) and the international border, persistent vulnerabilities remain, particularly in riverine patches and difficult terrains. After the 2016 Pathankot attack, the government launched the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS), an ambitious technological leap aimed at real-time, foolproof surveillance. CIBMS incorporates thermal imagers, infrared and laser-based intruder alarms, aerostats for aerial surveillance, unattended ground sensors, radars, sonar systems for water bodies, and fibre-optic sensors—all feeding data to a central command system for swift response.

Yet, progress on CIBMS has been patchy. Initially, the government set a target to seal the India-Pakistan border by December 2018. However, by December 2023, the goal remained unmet, prompting a revised deadline of December 2025. Delays have been attributed to technological constraints and inconsistent planning. Some suggestions, such as deploying motorised pulleys to ferry guards across vulnerable river patches, bordered on the absurd and were rightly discarded for exposing soldiers to undue risk.

Adding to the challenges is the unforgiving weather. In winter, the LoC is buried under heavy snowfall, sometimes piling up to 15 feet, damaging almost a third of the fencing annually. Repairing these fences is an arduous and dangerous task, involving hauling material through treacherous, snow-clad mountains. As retired Lt Gen D S Hooda, former Northern Army Commander, points out, the months-long process of repairing damaged fencing inevitably creates exploitable gaps that infiltrators eagerly target. Even where fencing remains intact, terrorists have been known to breach three-layer concertina wires, emphasizing that the human element—alert, resilient, and well-equipped soldiers—remains irreplaceable.

The conditions under which border troops operate are nothing short of extreme. In sub-zero temperatures, with limited visibility due to fog and rain, maintaining 24x7 vigilance is a herculean effort. As Lt Gen Hooda candidly recalled, ensuring that a soldier got even one full night’s sleep every three days was a luxury in such inhospitable conditions. Technological aids such as night-vision devices, though indispensable, come with limitations of their own, including limited battery life and maintenance challenges in remote, power-starved locations.

Given the evolving threat landscape, mere incremental upgrades to the current system will not suffice. A fundamental technological overhaul is necessary. Building fences capable of withstanding heavy snow loads is crucial, as is the deployment of advanced tunnel-detection systems and enhanced aerial surveillance to cover difficult and inaccessible areas. “What we need is a smart fence,” Hooda emphasized—a system wherein a breach immediately triggers an alert at the nearest command centre, enabling swift interception of intruders. While the cost of implementing such smart fencing solutions is high, it pales in comparison to the cost of lives lost and security compromised.

Furthermore, the changing dynamics of terrorism in the Valley must shape the security strategy. Terror recruitment within Kashmir has hit an all-time low—a promising sign that must be protected at all costs. In 2024, Chief of Army Staff General Upendra Dwivedi noted that 60% of the 73 terrorists killed in counter-terror operations in J&K were Pakistani nationals. This statistic reinforces the view that the principal threat comes not from within the Valley but across the border. Therefore, strengthening the anti-infiltration apparatus must remain a top national security priority.

The Pahalgam massacre is a sombre reminder that despite decades of efforts, the battle against cross-border terrorism is far from over. While India has made significant strides in reducing infiltration and neutralizing terror networks, the evolving tactics of adversaries demand constant adaptation and investment. In the harsh jungles of the Pir Panjal, where a moment’s lapse can lead to a tragedy of unimaginable scale, the commitment to vigilance, technological innovation, and strategic foresight must be unwavering. Only then can the dream of a truly secure Kashmir—and by extension, a secure India—be realized.