Why India is bypassing Bangladesh to connect the Northeast via Myanmar

Dipak Kurmi

(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com.)

Amid the cooling of once-warm ties with Dhaka, New Delhi is pivoting with renewed urgency to a long-delayed infrastructural ambition—the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP). A crucial component of India’s Act East Policy, the project has emerged as an indispensable alternative to the Bangladesh corridor for connecting the remote northeastern states with the Indian mainland and seaports. As geopolitical winds shift in South Asia, what was once envisioned as a supplementary route has now become a geopolitical imperative.

The KMMTTP, first conceptualised in the late 1990s and formalised in 2008 through a bilateral agreement between India and Myanmar, aims to establish a seamless transit corridor from the eastern Indian port city of Kolkata to the landlocked state of Mizoram via Myanmar’s Rakhine and Chin states. At full throttle, the route would begin with a maritime journey from Kolkata to the upgraded port of Sittwe in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, proceed inland via the Kaladan River to Paletwa, and continue by road to Zorinpui on the India-Myanmar border, from where it would connect with the existing road network in Mizoram.

The primary rationale behind the KMMTTP has always been to provide strategic redundancy to the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor—India’s sole land access to the Northeast. Often termed the “Chicken’s Neck”, this narrow 20-km-wide strip of land wedged between Nepal and Bangladesh has long been perceived as India’s Achilles’ heel, posing both logistical and strategic risks. The Kaladan project, by reducing the distance between Kolkata and Mizoram by approximately 1,000 km and cutting down journey time by three to four days, promised not only economic viability but also a strategic edge.

Yet for more than a decade, the Kaladan corridor has languished in a geopolitical limbo. The original target for completion was set for 2016, but the worsening security situation in Myanmar—especially in the ethnically volatile Rakhine State—has delayed the project indefinitely. Since the military coup in 2021 ousted Myanmar’s civilian government, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) has been locked in a protracted conflict with numerous ethnic militias. A 2024 BBC study estimated that the Tatmadaw’s effective control extends to merely 21% of the national territory. Much of the Rakhine State, through which a crucial leg of the Kaladan route passes, is now under the control of the Arakan Army—an ethnic Rakhine armed group recently rebranded as the Rakhine Army. Despite being designated a terrorist group by the junta in Yangon, the Arakan Army asserts its support for the Kaladan project, even claiming to provide security along the route since 2021.

While India’s Ministry of External Affairs had initially backed the project as a dual-benefit development—facilitating connectivity to Northeast India while contributing to infrastructure development in Myanmar—the reality has proven more complex. In 2022, New Delhi contracted IRCON International Limited, a public sector engineering and construction firm under Indian Railways, to fast-track the remaining construction. IRCON, in turn, was authorised to sub-contract work on the 50-km incomplete highway stretch between Kaletwa and Zorinpui. Though this deal came with a firm deadline of 40 months, it contained a caveat allowing deadline extensions in the event of “war, riots, or civil disorder”—an implicit acknowledgement of the fragile conditions in Myanmar.

Meanwhile, as progress on the ground inches forward, India is recalibrating its internal logistics network to align with the eventual completion of the Kaladan route. A strategic move in this direction is the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways’ recent sanctioning of a 166.8-km four-lane highway between Shillong in Meghalaya and Silchar in Assam. This road, once completed, will link further down to Zorinpui in Mizoram, effectively knitting the Kaladan corridor into the broader Northeast High-Speed Road Grid. According to officials from the National Highways & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (NHIDCL), this enhanced network will allow cargo to flow from ports in Visakhapatnam and Kolkata to Northeast India without relying on Bangladesh. “With the help of the Kaladan project, cargo will reach from Vizag and Kolkata to the Northeast, without being dependent on Bangladesh,” a senior NHIDCL official noted.

This recalibration is not without context. India’s pivot away from Bangladesh is rooted in a discernible downturn in bilateral relations since the ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. Hasina had been India’s most reliable ally in Dhaka, facilitating transshipment routes and providing overland access to the Northeast through Bangladesh. However, the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus has signalled a shift in posture, perceived in New Delhi as less accommodating. Yunus’s statement during a diplomatic trip to China—calling Northeast India “landlocked” and Bangladesh “the only guardian of the ocean”—sent ripples of concern through Indian strategic circles. Coming as they did in the midst of escalating India-China competition in the region, Yunus’s comments were interpreted as a direct snub to India’s strategic interests.

In response, India has accelerated its “Look East” and “Act East” policies. If Bangladesh under Sheikh Hasina had offered India a strategic opening through its ports like Chattogram and Mongla, the new dispensation’s perceived hostility is pushing India to solidify direct, self-reliant alternatives. The Kaladan Project, along with its sister initiative—the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway—is being reinvested with strategic urgency. Indeed, the Act East Policy, as championed by the Modi government, is not merely about economic integration but is also meant to fortify geopolitical leverage across Southeast Asia.

The completion of the Kaladan corridor will also serve India’s long-term vision of regional influence. As China continues to cement its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) footprint through Myanmar with projects like the Kyaukpyu port and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), New Delhi views the KMMTTP as a countervailing force—a corridor that can anchor Indian presence in the same strategic space. Moreover, Myanmar’s own interests align with this. The infrastructure being developed under the KMMTTP—ports, jetties, roads—is expected to benefit the local Rakhine population economically, many of whom are disillusioned with both the junta and insurgent factions.

Yet the road ahead remains fraught. While the Kolkata-Sittwe shipping route is operational and the Sittwe-Paletwa riverine leg has been dredged and equipped with adequate jetty infrastructure, the final land stretch remains in political limbo. Even as Zorinpui on the Indian side has an operational Integrated Customs and Immigration Checkpost since 2017, the highway from Kaletwa to Zorinpui remains the critical missing link. Political will, sustained diplomatic engagement with both the Myanmar junta and local militias, and security assurances will be paramount in turning this logistical blueprint into an operational reality.

In the longer arc of India’s grand strategy, the Kaladan project is more than an infrastructure initiative—it is a manifestation of India’s attempt to redefine its connectivity matrix, assert strategic autonomy, and recalibrate its regional partnerships. In a world where the balance of power is fluid and alliances are transactional, control over one’s own transit routes is more than convenience—it is sovereignty.

As the geostrategic tectonics in South Asia shift, India’s focus on completing the Kaladan corridor signals a decisive turn in its regional calculus. With Bangladesh increasingly leaning towards China and Myanmar embroiled in internal chaos, the road to the Northeast may be long and uncertain—but for India, it is now non-negotiable.