India-China relations navigate turbulent skies

Dipak Kurmi

(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com.)

The skies between India and China have reopened, but the path to normalised relations remains shrouded in uncertainty. On October 26, a significant milestone was reached when direct flights resumed between the two Asian giants after a hiatus that began with the Covid-19 pandemic and was subsequently frozen by the deadly Galwan Valley clashes in 2020. While this development has been heralded as a positive step toward reconciliation, it barely scratches the surface of the deep-seated mistrust and unresolved territorial disputes that continue to plague one of the world’s most consequential bilateral relationships.

IndiGo, India’s largest carrier, has initiated direct flights to Guangzhou, marking the first tangible manifestation of renewed connectivity. China Eastern Airlines has followed suit, announcing the launch of a Shanghai-Delhi route commencing November 9, with operations scheduled three times weekly. Air India, not to be left behind, plans to resume its Chinese operations by the end of 2025. Qin Yong, a senior Chinese consular official, characterised the resumption as “a very important day for the India–China relationship,” while Indian government representatives have emphasised its role in enhancing people-to-people contact and supporting the normalisation of ties. These flights emerged from the diplomatic groundwork laid during multiple rounds of negotiations, culminating in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in China.

The practical benefits of restored air connectivity cannot be understated. Prior to the suspension in 2019, approximately 2,600 flights operated annually between the two nations, according to travel data provider OAG. The intervening years forced Indian and Chinese travellers to endure circuitous journeys involving multiple connecting flights, adding considerable time, expense, and inconvenience to cross-border travel. The resumption addresses these logistical nightmares, potentially facilitating business transactions, educational exchanges, and tourism. India has complemented this development by reopening its doors to Chinese tourists and initiating processes to approve the entry of Chinese goods into Indian markets. A senior government official has indicated that licences for suppliers from various countries, including China, will soon be issued and renewed, suggesting a broader thaw in commercial relations.

However, beneath this veneer of progress lies a fundamentally unchanged reality. The Chinese media, while welcoming the flights, has been quick to point out asymmetries in the relationship. The Global Times, citing a representative from a Chinese enterprise operating in India, noted that “China is showing a willingness to deepen economic cooperation, but India’s attitude toward Chinese-funded companies has not fundamentally changed.” This observation encapsulates the persistent mutual suspicion that characterises the relationship. Chinese businesses continue to face scrutiny and restrictions in India, particularly in sensitive sectors such as telecommunications and technology, reflecting New Delhi’s security concerns about Beijing’s intentions.

The elephant in the room—or perhaps more appropriately, the dragon on the border—remains the unresolved territorial dispute that has poisoned relations for decades. Since October 2024, despite some positive momentum, the fundamental challenge of demarcating and securing the lengthy Sino-Indian border persists. What makes this particularly striking is the apparent lack of urgency in addressing what both sides acknowledge as the core issue. India has consistently emphasised the imperative of settling the border dispute at the earliest opportunity, recognising its potential to derail any progress in other domains and render diplomatic gains futile. The Indian perspective is clear: a settled, conflict-free border must be the priority, the foundation upon which other aspects of the relationship can be constructed.

Beijing, conversely, appears more focused on economic opportunities, particularly access to India’s vast consumer market and the potential for expanded commercial engagement. This divergence in priorities reflects fundamentally different strategic calculus. For India, sovereignty and territorial integrity are non-negotiable preconditions for normalisation. For China, economic interdependence and commercial benefits seem to take precedence, with border issues relegated to protracted negotiations that proceed at a glacial pace.

History offers a sobering lesson about the limitations of economic engagement divorced from political resolution. The normalisation of relations in 1988, following then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s landmark visit to China, was predicated on the assumption that economic integration and people-to-people exchanges would generate the momentum necessary for improved ties. The intervening decades have comprehensively disproven this hypothesis. Despite bilateral trade reaching an impressive $130 billion, no degree of economic interdependence has succeeded in building genuine trust or diminishing the centrality of the border dispute. The Galwan Valley confrontation in 2020, which claimed the lives of twenty Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese troops, demonstrated unequivocally that commercial ties provide no insurance against military conflict when territorial claims remain contested.

Sovereignty and nationalism further complicate resolution efforts. In both nations, territorial integrity has become intertwined with national identity and political legitimacy. Any government perceived as compromising on border issues risks domestic backlash, constraining the room for diplomatic manoeuvre. Until the border is definitively settled and genuine trust established, any peace constructed through trade and connectivity will remain fundamentally fragile, vulnerable to the next crisis that inevitably emerges along the disputed frontier.

The broader geopolitical context adds another layer of complexity to India-China relations. Following the recent meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, Trump’s invocation of the “G2” concept underscored the enduring interdependence between Washington and Beijing. Trump’s statement that “My G2 meeting with President Xi of China was a great one for both of our countries. This meeting will lead to everlasting peace and success. God bless both China and the US” highlights how major powers prioritise economic pragmatism over ideological differences when national interests dictate. This reality is further illustrated by the trade dynamics: US tariffs on Indian goods currently stand at 50 per cent, while those on Chinese products have been reduced to 47 per cent—lower than India’s. This differential treatment demonstrates that even in the midst of strategic competition, Washington recognises the impossibility of decoupling from China’s economy.

For India, these developments carry important implications. The realities of trade and interdependence in a globalised world cannot be ignored or wished away. Interaction and engagement are essential, yet they must be balanced against sovereignty and security concerns that continue to drive foreign policy decisions. People-to-people exchanges, while valuable, have not by themselves strengthened India-China ties in any meaningful way. The resumption of flights, the expansion of tourism, and the potential growth in trade are all positive developments, but they cannot substitute for the hard work of political reconciliation and territorial settlement.

What is required for a genuine thaw and the establishment of lasting trust goes far beyond the mechanical restoration of connectivity. India and China must not only interact but also develop a deeper understanding of each other’s strategic perspectives, security imperatives, and domestic political constraints. They must demonstrate the political will to work collaboratively toward resolving their differences, particularly the border dispute that casts a long shadow over all other aspects of the relationship. Until that fundamental issue is addressed with the seriousness and urgency it demands, the resumption of direct flights will remain a symbolic gesture rather than a transformative development—a convenient facilitator of travel that papers over, but does not resolve, the profound challenges that continue to define this critical bilateral relationship.