Modi's Chi Visit & The Northeast India Effect

DATELINE  Guwahati /Wasbir Hussain

Prime Minister rendra Modi’s much hyped Chi visit (May 14-16) may have generated enough sigls about the two Asian giants attempting to move beyond status quo on key fronts, but in Northeast India, that shares a mountainous border with Chi’s Tibet region, the mood after the trip, if anything, has been gloomy. That’s because there has been no indication that the concerns of the region—that include Chi building mega dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) or even planning to divert the river or the issue of people from Northeast India, particularly Aruchal Pradesh, being given stapled visas by Chi—were raised by India or accepted by the Chinese of their own as matters that need consideration or re-consideration.

 No wonder, as the three-day visit came to a close, Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi lamented over Modi not raising the issue of Chi building massive dams on the Tsangpo, close to the Indian border as the river enters Aruchal Pradesh. Gogoi said the Prime Minister has done a ‘grave injustice’ to Assam by not raising the issue of damns. If Gogoi openly expressed his concern over the issue of big dams on the Chinese side that can deplete the quantum of water flow on the Brahmaputra, Aruchal Pradesh Chief Minister bam Tuki expressed ‘shock’ at the ‘ippropriate response’ from New Delhi to a section of the Chinese official media showing a map of India by excluding Aruchal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir. “Aruchal Pradesh is an integral part of India and we expect a strong stand from the Centre to settle this (border) issue once and for all,” Tuki said.

If Sino-Indian ties have been held hostage by the events that led to or followed the 1962 war, the two tions will have to make direct attempts to resolve the border issue. How long, after all, can Chi continue claiming the whole of Aruchal Pradesh? Once again, during the Modi visit, one could see a status quoist approach on the subject. The joint statement only went to the extent of re-stating that the two sides wanted an early political settlement of the boundary question. It said this endeavour must be pursued as a ‘strategic objective’ by the two governments.

Of course, there is a very interesting sentence in the joint statement that talks about the two tions reaffirming their commitment to ‘push forward negotiations on the framework for a boundary settlement based on the outcomes and common understanding achieved so far...’ If a settlement has to be reached keeping in view the ‘outcomes and common understanding achieved so far’, one must remember the 2005 agreement between the two tions on ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-Chi Boundary Question.’ Article Seven of this Agreement says: ‘In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.’ If Beijing is to honour this 2005 commitment, Chi simply cannot or should not lay claim on Aruchal Pradesh that has a settled population along the border who have time and again expressed their unflinching allegiance to India as its citizens.

If Beijing can keep reiterating that the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is an integral part of Chi, New Delhi too could have reiterated during Modi’s visit that Aruchal Pradesh is India’s integral part, a state that has a well ‘settled population’ along the border. By saying so, India would not have gone anywhere beyond the 2005 Agreement that Chi has been a sigtory to. Modi has proved on several occasions during his one-year in office that he is a decisive Prime Minister, something India had not seen in the immediate past. It was, therefore, not surprising to find him announcing India’s decision to “extend electronic tourist visas to Chinese tiols.” Expectedly, Chi welcomed this move but refrained from saying whether it would reciprocate. Beijing was also silent on the issue of providing stapled visas to people from Aruchal Pradesh wanting to visit the country to drive home its claim on the territory.

The way market forces are beginning to dictate or determine bilateral ties between tions, the border dispute between India and Chi can remain in the backburner for an indefinite period and there can be business as usual on other matters. But that may not be the case in so far as the issue of waters of shared rivers between the two neighbours. Chi has already operatiolized a unit of the 500 MW Zangmu dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo and is set to build three new dams on the river. Beijing has made it clear it would ‘vigorously’ push hydropower projects in Tibet in its current Five Year Plan (2011-15) to reduce the energy shortfall in the region. Green groups in Northeast India and Bangladesh fear this would lead to reduction in the water flow on the Brahmaputra and cause other disasters like massive siltation.

New Delhi is disadvantaged because of the absence of a water treaty between the two tions. The only agreement that India and Chi have on the subject is over hydrological data sharing. Once again, the Chinese have made no effort to indicate it was ready to share its plans about building dams on trans-boundary rivers. The only thing which came on the subject during the Modi visit was a reiteration on providing flood-season hydrological data and ‘assistance in emergency magement’. This actually means nothing as Beijing has been less than transparent on what its plans are on rivers that flow out to India, particularly the Yarlung Tsangpo.

Yes, New Delhi and Beijing did note, what they said, the increasingly important role played by Indian States and Chinese Provinces in advancing the bilateral relationship. The two sides agreed to establish a State/Provincial Leaders’ Forum and the first meeting of the Forum, attended by  Prime Minister Modi and Premier Li Keqiang, was held in Beijing on May 15. Whether the possible role of states in India’s Northeast figured in this Forum is not known, but unless border regions are factored in any confidence building measures, the desired results may not really be achieved.