India-Bangladesh ties at a crossroads: Rising tensions and unresolved issues

Sanjoy Deben

(Sanjoy Deben, a research scholar at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, can be reached via email at sanjoydebenjnu@gmail.com.)

The recent diplomatic exchanges between India and Bangladesh, particularly the talks held on Monday in Dhaka between India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and his Bangladeshi counterpart Mohammad Jashim Uddin, come against a backdrop of growing tensions between the two nations. These tensions, which have worsened since Sheikh Hasina’s ousting as Prime Minister on August 5, 2024, highlight the fragile state of bilateral relations and the unresolved issues that continue to plague the relationship.

While the discussions between Misri and Uddin reportedly maintained a tone of mutual goodwill, several key contentious matters remain unresolved, especially the issue of the persecution of minorities in Bangladesh. Misri raised concerns regarding the treatment of minorities, particularly Hindus, a topic that has stirred both domestic and international controversy. However, Uddin rejected these claims, dismissing them as exaggerated and falsely reported, asserting that they were matters for Bangladesh to handle internally, without interference from India. This stark difference in perspectives suggests that, despite diplomatic efforts, the core issues dividing the two countries remain deeply entrenched.

Despite expressions of goodwill, the optimism for improved relations between India and Bangladesh seems misguided. The interim government in Dhaka, especially in the wake of Hasina’s ouster, harbours a distinct animosity towards India, a sentiment reflected in several incidents that have fuelled diplomatic tensions. One such incident occurred on December 2, 2024, in Agartala, Tripura, where protesters from the Hindu Sangharsh Samiti, voicing their outrage over the treatment of minorities in Bangladesh, attacked the premises of Bangladesh’s Assistant High Commission. The demonstrators damaged property and set fire to the Bangladesh flag. In response, India suspended three police officers for failing to prevent the attack and arrested several protesters, ramping up security around the mission. Despite India’s regret over the incident, Bangladesh’s foreign ministry issued a sharp protest, demanding immediate action to ensure the safety and security of its diplomatic missions in India. The tension escalated further when Bangladesh’s foreign ministry claimed that the protests were pre-planned, with the demonstrators being allowed to breach the mission’s premises.

The Agartala incident was not isolated. Earlier, on November 28, 2024, in Kolkata, a similar protest occurred when demonstrators set fire to Bangladesh’s national flag and an effigy of Muhammad Yunus, a prominent Bangladeshi figure. The government of Bangladesh, in both cases, framed these incidents as part of a larger pattern of Indian hostility and lack of diplomatic security. However, the reactions from Dhaka seemed designed not only to register a protest but to stoke anti-India sentiments, further complicating the relationship.

The situation took a more serious turn on August 5, 2024, when, in the aftermath of Hasina’s removal, a mob in Dhaka attacked the Indira Gandhi Cultural Centre (IGCC), India’s cultural hub in Bangladesh. The attackers set sections of the building on fire, ransacked the premises, and looted valuable items, including books, computers, and stationery. The Indian staff at the High Commission was forced to seek shelter within the premises while contacting the Bangladesh Army for protection. Although the army sent troops, it made clear that they would not intervene if the mob attacked the High Commission. This incident further strained relations, as no arrests have been made to date, despite India’s protests and appeals to the Bangladeshi government for justice.

Another layer of complexity in India-Bangladesh relations is the rising tide of anti-India sentiment within some factions of the Bangladeshi leadership. For instance, leaders of the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement (ADSM) accused India of causing devastating floods in eastern Bangladesh by unilaterally opening the sluice gates of the Dumbur Dam without prior warning. According to Mohammad Nahid Islam, an adviser to the Bangladesh government, India had acted inhumanely by not coordinating with Bangladesh before releasing water from the dam, causing untold damage. While the floods were indeed severe, subsequent investigations revealed that the rainfall in both India and Bangladesh was unprecedented, making the dam’s release a consequence of natural conditions rather than an intentional act of malice. Despite this, anti-India rhetoric, especially from figures in the government, continues to thrive, with the people of Bangladesh being urged to oppose India’s actions.

Not only does the current political climate in Bangladesh fuel tensions with India, but the growing influence of Islamist parties and figures within the government adds an additional layer of complexity. Several advisers to the interim government, such as Home Adviser Lt-Gen Jahangir Alam Chowdhury and Religious Affairs Adviser AFM Khalid Hossain, have made openly hostile statements towards India, further complicating bilateral relations. Chowdhury’s history of antagonism towards India dates back to his tenure as the Director-General of Bangladesh Rifles (now Border Guards Bangladesh), where he mocked India’s concerns about insurgent activities on the Bangladesh-India border. Hossain, a leader of the Hefazat-e-Islam, an Islamist group known for its hostility towards India, has also been critical of India’s foreign policy, particularly regarding its treatment of Muslims. Such figures, despite their positions of influence, represent a growing ideological divide between the two countries, and their influence is likely to shape Bangladesh’s approach to India in the coming years.

The growing prominence of Islamist groups is evident not only in the political statements but also in the cultural and religious rhetoric circulating within Bangladesh. The Hefazat-e-Islam, which has previously engaged in violent protests against India, continues to wield significant influence. In late November 2024, Mamunul Haque, a key figure in the group, hailed the events of August 5 as a step toward an Islamic revolution in Bangladesh, signalling the increasing prominence of Islamist ideology in the country’s political discourse. This trend poses a long-term challenge to India-Bangladesh relations, as the influence of extremist groups could drive more radical policies that alienate India further.

Moreover, the recent lifting of the ban on the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, a party with strong Islamist leanings, signals a shift in Bangladesh’s political landscape that could have lasting implications for its relations with India. The Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, have long been critical of India, and their resurgence in the political arena could signal a return to more confrontational policies towards its neighbour.

In conclusion, while India and Bangladesh have long shared a relationship marked by mutual benefits and cultural ties, the current trajectory of their diplomatic relations is deeply concerning. The rise of anti-India sentiment, fuelled by both political figures and extremist factions, combined with unresolved issues like the treatment of minorities and border disputes, suggests that the future of the bilateral relationship may be increasingly fraught with tension. As the interim government in Bangladesh continues to navigate these complex dynamics, it remains to be seen whether India-Bangladesh relations can weather these storms or if they will descend into a prolonged period of antagonism and distrust. For now, the hopes of amicable cooperation between the two nations appear distant, overshadowed by the political and ideological forces at play.