Dipak Kurmi
(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com.)
The quiet of South Asia’s eastern seaboard belies the turbulent geopolitical undercurrents currently shaping Bangladesh. The events that transpired in Dhaka last August, which saw Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s abrupt displacement, have triggered alarm bells in New Delhi and elsewhere. Observers argue that this dramatic regime shift bears the hallmarks of foreign orchestration, particularly from Washington, D.C. The elevation of Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus as the Chief Adviser to the interim government only deepened suspicions.
Yunus’ ascension bypassed constitutional protocol, which mandates that a caretaker administration be headed by a former Supreme Court judge. However, the army’s support for this deviation effectively legitimised the political manoeuvre. Yunus’ immediate foreign engagements further fuelled speculation. He travelled to the U.S. capital with a student leader central to the protests preceding the regime change, meeting with influential figures such as Bill Clinton and, reportedly, President Joe Biden. This sequence of events fortified the narrative that the U.S. deep state had choreographed the transition in Dhaka.
For India, these developments are particularly unsettling. Sheikh Hasina, while occasionally at odds with Indian policy, remained a steadfast partner on vital issues—cross-border terrorism, water-sharing, and trade. Her ousting threatens to unravel years of careful bilateral cooperation. Yunus, by contrast, has taken positions that appear increasingly adversarial to India. His recent remarks during a visit to Beijing, where he addressed a business forum in the presence of Chinese President Xi Jinping, were especially jarring. Claiming that Bangladesh is the “guardian of the ocean for all of this region”, he seemed to ignore basic geography and maritime realities.
India, with its 7,516 km-long coastline (including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands), possesses an unrivalled strategic position in the Indian Ocean. Its naval capabilities—anchored by nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and a robust eastern fleet—underscore its dominance. By contrast, Bangladesh’s 580-km coastline hardly qualifies it as the maritime linchpin of South Asia. The assertion stretches credulity and reflects a geopolitical naivety or deliberate posturing intended to court Beijing.
India has attempted to convey its concerns through diplomatic channels. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s discreet visit to Dhaka and his meeting with Yunus signalled New Delhi’s disapproval. However, Yunus’ pivot towards China has continued. His invitation to Chinese investors to explore opportunities in Bangladesh, particularly in Mongla port, previously awarded to India under Hasina’s leadership, points to a deliberate recalibration of Bangladesh’s strategic alignments. That this occurred while two U.S. generals were visiting Bangladesh reveals the layered complexity of external influences in Dhaka.
Moreover, Yunus has reportedly extended an invitation to Pakistan to construct an airbase in Lalmonirhat, dangerously close to the sensitive Siliguri Corridor, also known as Chicken’s Neck. This narrow stretch of land is vital for India, connecting its northeastern states to the rest of the country. Any foreign military presence here would be seen by India as a direct threat to its territorial integrity.
The geopolitical stakes extend further south to the Bay of Bengal and neighbouring Myanmar. Before her exit, Hasina had rebuffed U.S. requests to use St Martin’s Island, located near the Myanmar coast. Its strategic location—just 9 km from Bangladesh’s southeastern peninsula and 8 km from Myanmar—makes it a coveted foothold in a region where the U.S. lacks a physical presence. The Biden administration’s interest in Myanmar, demonstrated by its $167 million allocation for humanitarian and non-lethal aid to ethnic armed groups, aligns with its Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at countering Chinese influence.
China’s investments and military ties in the region further complicate matters. It backs both the Myanmar junta and various insurgent groups, not out of ideological sympathy, but to secure its vital oil conduit from Kyaukphyu to Kunming, bypassing the vulnerable Malacca Strait. To balance this, Myanmar granted India the rights to develop and operate Sittwe port as part of the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, which offers an alternative trade route to India’s northeast and a potential corridor linking to Southeast Asia.
In Bangladesh, China remains deeply entrenched. It is the largest supplier of arms and infrastructure investment, with 11 ongoing projects creating jobs for over 55,000 Bangladeshis. Bangladesh is also a key participant in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite this, Hasina’s government had earlier drawn the line, declining China’s request for its navy (PLAN) to operate from Bangladeshi ports—an attempt to avoid turning the Bay of Bengal into another arena of great power contest.
The fragile situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine state adds another layer of volatility. The Arakan Army has seized control over most of the region, save for the ports of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. Their military campaigns have displaced Rohingyas, pushing them towards Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts and border areas with India’s Tripura. This region, just 17 km wide and opening into the Bay of Bengal, could become a flashpoint. With Chittagong harbour lying within this vulnerable corridor, fears of territorial fragmentation are not unfounded.
Against this backdrop, the role of the U.S. remains ambivalent. President Trump’s earlier suspension of USAID to Rohingya refugees has worsened humanitarian conditions, while current U.S. policy appears driven more by geopolitical containment than developmental concerns. The simultaneous interests of the U.S., China, and now Pakistan in Bangladesh’s strategic assets suggest that Dhaka is becoming the latest pawn in the grand chessboard of Indo-Pacific rivalry.
India cannot remain indifferent. Its armed forces have longstanding cooperation with Bangladesh, especially through naval training and joint exercises. These ties, cultivated over decades, are now at risk of being undermined by external players seeking to reshape South Asia’s geopolitical architecture.
Bangladesh must tread carefully. Pursuing multi-vector diplomacy is understandable for a small state, but abandoning strategic balance and alienating traditional partners could prove costly. The country would do well to focus on resolving its internal challenges rather than courting new external ones. The region is already crowded with competing interests, and another misstep could turn Bangladesh from a sovereign actor into a strategic battleground.
At this critical juncture, stability in the Bay of Bengal hinges not only on grand strategies emanating from Beijing or Washington but also on the prudence of Dhaka. As history has repeatedly shown, the price of geopolitical adventurism in South Asia is almost always paid by those closest to the flame.