Jawaharlal Nehru was in two minds over the genuineness of India's claim over the Ladakh sector. During a debate in the Parliament he said, "But, nevertheless, the fact remains that this area (Aksai Chin) is a most extraordinary area in the world so far as terrain is concerned. At that rate no tree grows anywhere in this wide area- there may be some shrubs".
Mahavir Tyagi stood up and pointing out to his own bald head thus retorted: "No hair grows on my head. Does it mean that the head has no value?"
Amitava Mukherjee
(Amitava Mukherjee is a senior journalist and commentator. He can be reached at amitavamukherjee253@gmail.com)
Mahavir Tyagi, the exceptional Congress parliamentarian from the 1950s to the 1970s, had once made an exceptional comment on India's foreign policy. The year was 1961. India was passing through a controversial phase in her relations with China over the issue of mutual international borders on the Himalayas. Among other areas of conflict was the Aksai Chin, an area of 16,000 feet elevation, in the Ladakh sector. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister was in two minds over the genuineness of India's claim over the area. During a debate in the Parliament he said, "But, nevertheless, the fact remains that this area (Aksai Chin) is a most extraordinary area in the world so far as terrain is concerned. At that rate no tree grows anywhere in this wide area- there may be some shrubs". Was it obvious that in a corner of his mind Nehru was ready to hand over this location to China?
Mahavir Tyagi stood up and pointing out to his own bald head thus retorted: "No hair grows on my head. Does it mean that the head has no value?"
Following decades have ruefully shown that prevarication and lack of foresight of the Indian government in the 1950s are now threatening the safety and security of India as a sovereign nation. In the war of 1962 China gobbled up the Aksai Chin and has since built an all-weather road through it connecting Tibet with its Xinjiang province. But the process had started in the 1950s when China first constructed a graveled road there. But for fifty years since 1962 India chose to remain reluctant to make its presence vigorously felt near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) of its border with China. So Amit Shah's statement after bifurcation of the Jammu and Kashmir into two Centrally-administered areas-'Whenever I talk about Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Aksai Chin comes under it and can die for it'- was really a game changer so far as Indo-China border conflicts are concerned. Game changer in the sense that for the first time since 1962 Beijing is feeling militarily threatened and is showing panic.
Why is China so panicky about the Ladakh sector? There are several reasons. The first is that the highway number 219 or the one that connects Tibet with Xinjiang is vital for Beijing's One China policy particularly at a time when there are uncomfortable portents over Hong Kong and Taiwan. Secondly the highway is vital for the success of China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative as it passes through the Pakistan ccupied Gilgit-Baltistan which abuts China's Xinjiang province. A belligerent India breathing down heavily near Xinjiang is dangerous for China as the province is inhabited by Uyghur Muslims who are protesting against alleged colonization of their homeland by the Han Chinese people.
Here lies the central factor behind the ongoing standoff. The most sinister aspect in the present scenario is China's aggressive posture in the Galwan valley which does not fall in the list of disputed areas so far agreed to by both New Delhi and Beijing. Galwan is the area which has no record of any previous confrontation between the two armies. Then why has the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China amassed forces and munitions about 6 kilometres north-east of Galwan rivulet's confluence with the Shyok river? The answer is the 255-kilometre-long Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DSDBO) road that would give the Indian army easy access to its last military post south of the Karakoram Pass. Till the present time the post is serviced by mule trains. This road saves nearly 15-kilometre-long last stretch. This last lap of construction necessitates construction of a 60-metre-long bridge across the Galwan rivulet in the Depsang plains. As and when the road is completed Daulat Beg Oldi will give India a superb launching pad and the motorable distance from Leh will come down to only six hours. The Indian Air Force has recently activated an airstrip in the Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) and transport planes are regularly landing there. The DBO is just 8 kilometres south of the Chinese border and 9 kilometres north-west of the Aksai Chin Line of Actual Control, enough to make China uncomfortable.
In the latest round of Lieutenant General level talks held on the Ladakh border, India has probably stood its ground and refused to stop construction of the DSDBO road. However, military experts are said to have detected unusual shifting of Chinese army positions along the Pangong Tso lake sector, a salt water lake whose 45 per cent belongs to India and the rest 55 per cent to China. Although Pangong Tso itself is not strategically important yet both of its banks- northern and southern- constitute the route through which China can make a push towards Chushul where India maintains an airfield and significant military installations. In fact, China tried to do this in 1962 but was stopped at the south-eastern approach to Chushul.
But Pangong Tso is a flash point and the hill on its northern bank juts out in eight major spurs. These spurs are called 'fingers' in military parlance. India claims that the border runs along finger 8 while China avers that it should be at finger 2. Anyway India's actual control runs up to finger 4 and last month's fisticuffs between Indian and Chinese soldiers had taken place at finger 6 where both the army patrols clashed with each other. Perhaps Indian contention is correct so far as the alignment of border is concerned here as China had some time back constructed a post at finger 4 but dismantled it after India had protested.
So far as the Indo-China military relations are concerned New Delhi does not have a good memory. The latest army-to-army talk between the two countries has ended on some pious words. This happened in 1962 also. Chinese army had at first voluntarily retreated after encircling some Indian military posts. This had given Jawaharlal Nehru fresh hopes of peaceful settlement. But the Chinese army came back soon and overwhelmed a number of Indian military posts. The rest is now history, known to everybody.