Amitava Mukherjee
(The author is a Kolkata-based senior journalist.
He can be reached at amitavamukherjee253@gmail.com)
Strategically, Arunachal Pradesh (AP), like the Ladakh sector, is an equally tantalising target for China. In the Ladakh sector, there is Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), situated on the tri-junction of India, the Pakistan-occupied Gigit-Baltistan, and China. DBO has an Indian military outpost and an airstrip. Situated at the feet of the Karakoram Pass, the outpost is located in an isolated place. It has China on the north, the China-occupied Aksai Chin on the east, the Pakistan-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan on the north-west, Jammu and Kashmir on the west, and Himachal Pradesh on the south. It is supplied with provisions by air or the recently constructed Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi road. But it is in no position to threaten China’s Xinjiang province or the Tibet-Xinjiang road through Aksai Chin. The area is barren, giving credence to Jawaharlal Nehru’s view that ‘not a blade of grass grows there’.
But the spot has high military importance because the Siachen glacier is close at hand.
Right at this moment, China’s strategy is to keep India on tenterhooks all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and in doing so, nothing serves it better than raising the tension over Arunachal Pradesh. AP is rich in natural resources, including water, which is going to cast a shadow over Indo-China relations in the days to come as China is running short of water very fast. Secondly, the Ladakh sector holds out for China the possibility of pushing through to Jammu and Kashmir at best, but in the case of the AP and the Doklam plateau, there is always the possibility of China capturing the Assam plains and cutting off the whole of north-eastern India. Here lies the real danger for New Delhi.
Beijing has described its latest cartographic invasion—showing Arunachal Pradesh as part of China in its recently released map—as a ‘routine’ exercise but has desisted from expounding the same. Developments along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and Tibet, however, indicate that there may be ominous portents.
On December 9, last year, China gave a demonstration of what it wanted to do along the LAC. The area in question was the Yangtse plateau in the Tawang sector of the Line of Actual Control. On that day, about 300 soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) surged up to the ridgeline of the LAC to push back the Indian army personnel stationed there in order to unilaterally change the status quo along the LAC. Hand-to-hand fights took place, and there were several injuries on both sides.
How could this be possible when Indian troops were occupying the ridgeline heights overlooking the Chinese positions at a much lower level across the LAC? Such a situation came about because China has vastly developed its infrastructural networks all along the LAC in recent times. On the Yangtse plateau, Beijing has constructed a new sealed road on their side that has facilitated the rapid surge of PLA armies in recent times. On the Indian side, the supply lines are mostly dirt tracks, which have again become vulnerable due to landslides, erosion, and various other environmental degradations. Although India has also invested heavily in recent times by building bridges, tunnels, and roads, it can be said with a fair amount of certainty that China is way ahead of India in the Arunachal Pradesh sector.
To what extent is there any real possibility of China invading Arunachal Pradesh? It is difficult to answer because no country opens up its military strategy so easily. But for Beijing, Tawang monastery is a real target, and China will always have its covetous eyes on Tawang in order to strengthen its hold on Tibet and diminish the influence of the Dalai Lama on the Tibetan Buddhists. It has learned another lesson from the Galwan skirmish of 2020, which showed that Han Chinese soldiers are not fully suitable for high-altitude warfare. So China first started inducting Tibetan youths as volunteers near the LAC. The latest reports indicate that they have now been taken on as regular soldiers in the PLA. These Tibetan soldiers are now seen in the areas opposite Arunachal Pradesh.
So the situation is tense, and Xi Jinping’s absence from the G-20 summit meeting has added fuel to many speculations. Will China try to push through Arunachal Pradesh in the near future? The movement of Chinese troops in their depth areas across the AP started quite some time ago, and after a lull of some period, that process has started again. Four sectors of Arunachal Pradesh—Asaphila, Tuting Axis, Chang Tze, and Fishtail 2—seem to be under the shadow of some kind of Chinese threat.
Particular mention must be made of the new villages that China has been building up with rapidity all along the LAC. Previously, large concentrations of such villages were noticed along the middle sector of the LAC, but recently, more concentrations of such units have been reported from the Arunachal Pradesh sector as well. Moreover, these are not just villages but military complexes as well.
It should not be construed as meaning that the Indian side is sitting idle. New military concepts like Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) have been put into operation. IBG means an operational unit that is agile, lean, and mean, fit for quick deployment and action. They comprise men and weaponry from several branches of the defence forces. Along with it, new technologies are also applied. They include drone and counterdrone systems, precision-guided ammunition, and surveillance systems.
Even 60 years after the Indo-Chinese War of 1962, no headway has been made to sort out the problem surrounding the McMahon line. With mutual distrust between India and China continuously rising over the Indo-Pacific and India joining the QUAD, prospects of a satisfactory solution to the Indo-China border problem are no longer in sight. It is significant that Xi Jinxing attended the BRICS conference but chose to avoid the G-20 summit. It is obvious that he is sending a snub to the United States and India.
In 1962, the Chinese withdrew their forces at a time when they could easily overrun the Assam plains. But 1962 and 2023 are not the same. The PLA also knows it very well from the heavy losses it has suffered in the Ladakh sector. Still, Arunachal Pradesh is a vulnerable point for India, and for Beijing, the AP is one of the principal foci of its overall military strategy in South Asia. Given the situation, India has no other choice but to gird up its loins to face any eventuality.