Dr Sudhir Kumar Das
(dasudhirk@gmail.com)
The Cold War has returned with a difference. During the post-WWII era, two ideologically competing superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, vied with each other to spread their respective spheres of influence. Smaller countries, finding no alternative, had to join one camp or the other. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the rise of China have changed the contours of the Cold War in the present geopolitical context. One world order is being replaced by another; the increasing unreliability of America under Trump and China's hesitance to engage in the security affairs of other nations have compelled middle powers to form smaller groups for mutual defence. The consequence of such a thought is the recently signed agreement between Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia. The tripartite defence agreement signed at the Mecca Al-Mukarramah Summit, termed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA), expresses a commitment to "collective defence" and "collective deterrence" but remains silent on any specific target countries. A clause in the agreement that "an attack against one shall be considered an attack against all" replicates Article Five of NATO. The timing of the pact is significant, as the US and Israel launched an attack against Iran on February 28th, consigning West Asia into the inferno of war. All the Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, are now scurrying for cover from the rain of Iranian and Houthi missiles and drones on their oil and defence assets for hosting American military bases. The fragile ceasefire mediated by Pakistan was just completed two months ago. The whims of the maniacally maverick American president Trump will determine how long the ceasefire lasts. Three countries, from South Asia, West Asia, and Europe, sign a defence agreement expressing their commitment to mutual defence, which becomes significant because nations are now seeking security guarantees well beyond their immediate neighbourhood.
Each Gulf nation is embroiled in its own unique security challenges. Saudi Arabia hosts American bases, making it a target for Iranian missiles and those from its proxy, the Houthis. by Iranian missiles and those from its proxy, the Houthis, due to its hosting of American bases. Its geopolitical interest clashes with the UAE in Yemen and Sudan. The unreliability of America as a security provider and the growing threats from Yemen and Iran pushed it into signing a defence agreement first with Pakistan and further expanding it by including Türkiye, overlooking its longstanding leadership rivalry with the Muslim ummah. Saudi Arabia has one more reason to join a defence pact outside the American circle because it has been subjected to coercive diplomacy by successive American administrations to sign the Abraham Accord in return for a security umbrella. Signing the Abraham Accord forces Saudi Arabia to normalise relations with Israel, which is anathema to the Saudi monarchy. By entering into this defence pact, Saudi Arabia can resist American pressure to some extent. However, it is important to remember that all three member countries are allies of the United States. It is important to note that all three member countries are allies of the United States.
The tripartite pact is a beneficial cooperation for all three participant countries-Pakistan with a combat-ready military also adds a nuclear dimension to the West Asian security spectrum. Türkiye has a flourishing military industry, particularly in drone manufacturing, while oil-rich Saudi Arabia possesses the capital to finance defence technology and manufacturing in both Türkiye and Pakistan, which is perennially underfunded. All three participant countries have complimentary assets to offer the others and deter their adversaries.
Although the pact refrains from clearly mentioning any specific country as the target, it is clearly discernible that the two countries Israel and Iran and its proxy, the Houthis, are the adversaries. None of the three participant countries immediately face any threat from Israel at this moment. However, each member nation of this pact has different national security challenges. Saudi Arabia perceives Iran as a more tangible enemy, considering its present belligerence against Gulf countries hosting US military bases and the Houthis on its southern border if the West Asia war further escalates. Türkiye and Pakistan face no immediate danger from Israel or Iran. To expect Türkiye and Pakistan to commit their militaries to fight Houthis and Iran on behalf of Saudi Arabia seems only a chimaera. It looks implausible that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan would join a war against Cyprus, Greece or the Kurds on behalf of Türkiye in the eastern Mediterranean. In the eventuality of a war between India and Pakistan, Türkiye at best would provide military equipment to Pakistan, as it had done during Operation Sindoor, and Saudi Arabia would supply free oil to Pakistan, euphemistically terming it as 'oil on deferred payment'. Considered pragmatically, the crux of this pact is to provide manpower, defence equipment, and technology to Saudi Arabia in exchange for its petrodollars. Türkiye will exploit the lucrative West Asian defence market, and Pakistan will rent its army to Saudi Arabia and, in return, get free oil and dollars in aid. Saudi Arabia needed this defence pact more than the other two countries did.
Many geopolitical analysts credit Pakistan for carving out a niche for itself as central to the West Asian security arrangement. It has not escaped the attention of the international community that Pakistan, a perennial recipient of aid from the Gulf countries, has enhanced its profile as a security provider in West Asia. But the international community is also mindful that a country's credibility as a geopolitical player rests on three pillars - economic heft, a credible and stable political system, and internal security. Pakistan has none of the three. The economy of Pakistan is in tatters, relying on one IMF tranche after another and supplemented by foreign aid. A political system without accountability lacks credibility, especially since the army, deeply involved in accountability and pervasive in decision-making in Pakistan, also lacks credibility. So far as its internal security is concerned, the biggest province of Baluchistan suffers from a decade-long separatist insurgency; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is effectively in control of TTP, and now the occupied Jammu and Kashmir too has flared up in anti-government protests on various issues. All these internal turmoils notwithstanding, Pakistan has successfully projected itself as a security provider to West Asian countries. Undoubtedly, Pakistan has enhanced its diplomatic profile in recent months by mediating between the US and Iran, which made it a central figure in the security spectrum of West Asia. Pakistan succeeded in appeasing Trump's ego when India failed to do so. It credited Trump for ending the brief conflict with India and found an opening in his administration. Pakistan's current international glory is largely a result of its proximity to the US. This relationship is largely due to Pakistan's proximity to the US. History tells the story of Pakistan-US relations. In 1979, Pakistan enjoyed a similar international standing when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, leading the US and the entire Western world to pour aid money into the bottomless coffers of the Pakistani establishment to drive the godless communists from Islamic Afghanistan and create the Taliban mujahedeen to fight the Soviets. Two decades later, the events of 9/11 profoundly impacted the world and forever altered the definition of terrorism. America returned to Pakistan for a second invasion of Afghanistan and opened its aid purse without any inhibition. It took a few years for the Americans to discover the duplicity of the Pakistani establishment. But Pakistan was central to its Afghanistan policy on both occasions in 1979 as well as 2001, just like it is now central to America's Iran and West Asia policy. When the US withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan instantly lost its relevance to the US. The key issue is that the diplomatic recognition Pakistan is currently enjoying in West Asia depends entirely on the approval of the American president. Once the Iran war concludes and normalcy returns to West Asia as it was before October 7, 2023, Pakistan will automatically lose its utility to West Asian countries. It has nothing to offer in terms of technology or economy. Its relevance is solely based on security-related issues, and once the security question is resolved, the provider of security will no longer be needed.
At present, the Pakistan-Türkiye-Saudi Arabia defence pact is certainly a concern for India. First, Pakistan will now feel emboldened by Turkish technology and Saudi funds to create trouble through cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India. Second, there is a significant adverse impact on India's ambitious IMEC (India-Middle-East-Europe Corridor) project. Second, the adverse impact on India's ambitious IMEC (India-Middle-East-Europe Corridor) project is significant. Third, it is a significant setback to India's attempt to isolate Pakistan diplomatically, as Pakistan has successfully projected itself as militarily and diplomatically more relevant to West Asia security and mediation between the US and Iran than India. In international relations nothing is permanent. Just as the challenges of 1979 and 2001 eventually passed, the current adversity will also be overcome. All that India needs now is to watch patiently and wait to see how the future reveals itself.