Dipak Kurmi
(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com.)
In a bold and calculated statement, Assam Chief Minister Dr. Himanta Biswa Sarma recently reminded Dhaka of its own geographical vulnerabilities. Drawing attention to Bangladesh’s “two chicken necks”, Sarma referenced the 80-kilometre North Bangladesh Corridor—which links the Rangpur division with the rest of the country—and the 28-kilometre Chittagong Corridor, the sole link between Bangladesh’s economic and political capitals. “If they attack ours, we will attack theirs,” he warned. His remarks, though framed as “geographical facts”, served as a direct deterrent to any thoughts of adventurism from across the border. The Chittagong Port, which handles the bulk of Bangladesh’s trade, is connected through the second corridor, meaning any disruption there would have devastating consequences for Bangladesh’s economy.
In the evolving landscape of South Asian geopolitics, geography often defines vulnerability as much as it defines strength. Nowhere is this reality more starkly evident than in the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow 22-kilometre strip of Indian territory known ominously as the “Chicken’s Neck”. This tenuous land link connects India’s vast mainland with its eight northeastern states and strategically pivotal Sikkim. Flanked by Nepal to the west, Bhutan to the north, and Bangladesh to the south, the corridor has long been understood as one of India’s most critical geopolitical chokepoints. In recent months, however, rising tensions with Bangladesh, deepening China-Bangladesh ties, and internal radical narratives have brought this strategic corridor into sharper focus, posing alarming new threats to India’s unity and security.
Historically vulnerable, the Siliguri Corridor first entered mainstream strategic discourse during the 2017 Doklam standoff. China’s attempt to build a road near the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction was a clear signal of its intent to inch closer to the corridor and test Indian resolve. The 73-day military standoff ended without escalation, but it triggered a reawakening in Indian defence circles about the pressing need to fortify this vital region. Since then, India has substantially enhanced troop deployment, conducted multiple military exercises, widened highways, improved railway infrastructure, and deployed high-tech surveillance systems across the area. Yet, geography’s inherent constraints—its narrowness, dense population, and logistical bottlenecks—cannot be fully mitigated by infrastructure alone.
What makes the current strategic scenario even more complex is the dramatic geopolitical repositioning of Bangladesh, once seen as a partner with shared cultural and historical ties. The new government in Dhaka, led by interim Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus, has sent confusing signals about Bangladesh’s strategic intentions. Following his recent visit to Beijing, Yunus made veiled threats referencing India’s “tenuous land link” with its northeast—an ominous suggestion that Bangladesh’s own geographical adjacency to the corridor might be leveraged in a time of crisis. These remarks were followed by an even more incendiary statement by retired Bangladeshi Major General ALM Fazlur Rahman. In a Facebook post made shortly after the Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir, Rahman provocatively suggested that Bangladesh should “occupy the seven northeastern states” of India in the event of an India-Pakistan war and even proposed a joint military alliance with China to that end. While Dhaka officially distanced itself from his remarks, the damage was done—the statement unveiled latent adversarial thinking within Bangladesh’s military elite, previously considered marginal.
This comes at a time when China is significantly expanding its strategic footprint in Bangladesh, including plans to develop the Lalmonirhat Airport—just a short distance from the Siliguri Corridor. While couched as a civilian project, the airport’s dual-use potential for military operations has not gone unnoticed in New Delhi. Infrastructure often precedes influence in geopolitics, and in this case, Chinese-backed development could allow Beijing indirect military access close to India’s most sensitive strategic chokepoint. This complements China’s already robust military infrastructure build-up in Tibet and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to the west, effectively drawing a strategic noose around India from both flanks.
India now faces a potentially destabilising two-front scenario in the Siliguri region—an overt Chinese threat from the north and a covert, increasingly ambiguous Bangladesh from the south. The corridor, which supports the movement of over 45 million Indian citizens in the northeast, as well as the entire region’s economic and military logistics, could become a prime target in a crisis. Adding to this external threat are internal voices that echo similar disruptive ideas. A few years ago, Sharjeel Imam, a controversial student leader, publicly advocated for cutting off the northeast from the Indian mainland by blocking the Siliguri Corridor during protests against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act. Though dismissed as fringe and seditious, such statements underscore how domestic radicalism can dangerously intersect with external geopolitical machinations.
Amid these rising threats, India is adopting a layered strategic approach. The central government has accelerated road and rail projects in the region, with dual-use infrastructure ensuring both civilian connectivity and rapid military mobilisation. The Indian Army’s Eastern Command has scaled up training drills and contingency planning to secure the corridor. Additionally, surveillance systems have been enhanced to monitor any hostile movement across both the China and Bangladesh borders. But beyond military preparedness, India’s response has also included strategic signalling.
In a bold and calculated statement, Assam Chief Minister Dr. Himanta Biswa Sarma recently reminded Dhaka of its own geographical vulnerabilities. Drawing attention to Bangladesh’s “two chicken necks”, Sarma referenced the 80-kilometre North Bangladesh Corridor—which links the Rangpur division with the rest of the country—and the 28-kilometre Chittagong Corridor, the sole link between Bangladesh’s economic and political capitals. “If they attack ours, we will attack theirs,” he warned. His remarks, though framed as “geographical facts”, served as a direct deterrent to any thoughts of adventurism from across the border. The Chittagong Port, which handles the bulk of Bangladesh’s trade, is connected through the second corridor, meaning any disruption there would have devastating consequences for Bangladesh’s economy.
This strategic balance of power, however, is delicate. While India possesses the military and infrastructural superiority to neutralise threats to the Siliguri Corridor, it must exercise this strength with diplomatic caution. Any overt show of coercion could drive Bangladesh further into China’s strategic embrace. At present, India remains a vital economic partner for Bangladesh—facilitating transit, energy cooperation, trade access, and infrastructural aid. Leveraging these ties carefully allows India to incentivise Dhaka’s cooperation while deterring adventurism. Yet this policy of restrained assertiveness can only be sustained as long as India’s regional supremacy is not perceived as weakness.
What lies ahead is not just a contest over land but over influence, deterrence, and the ability to control narratives. India’s strategic thinkers, including Brahma Chellaney and C. Raja Mohan, have repeatedly warned of the dangers of encirclement—Pakistan’s hostility in the west, China’s assertiveness in the north, and a shifting Bangladesh in the east. These threats converge at the Siliguri Corridor, making it a keystone of national unity. This convergence reinforces India’s imperative to bolster strategic autonomy, deepen defence partnerships with regional allies like Bhutan, and reinforce its Act East policy—not merely as an economic doctrine but as a security imperative.
In essence, the Siliguri Corridor is more than a narrow piece of land; it is a symbolic and literal artery of Indian nationhood. It underscores the nation’s vulnerability while reflecting its resilience. As threats loom from both within and beyond, India’s response must be holistic—combining hard power, infrastructural depth, internal vigilance, and deft diplomacy. The Chicken’s Neck must not become the nation’s Achilles’ heel. In securing this corridor, India sends a powerful message—not only to its adversaries but to its own citizens: that national integrity is non-negotiable, and while India seeks peace and stability, it will not hesitate to act decisively when its sovereignty is challenged.