Dipak Kurmi
(The writer can be reached at dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com.)
In a significant diplomatic overture that hints at a cautious thaw in a long-frosted bilateral relationship, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar embarked on a historic visit to China this week—his first since the violent Galwan clash of 2020. This six-year hiatus in direct high-level engagement had symbolised the deep rift between the two nuclear-armed Asian neighbours. His return to Beijing carries implications far beyond bilateral ties; it represents India’s broader strategic ambition to balance national interest with regional stability and multilateral cooperation—a difficult, yet necessary, pursuit in an increasingly multipolar and conflicted world.
The timing and context of this visit are crucial. Dr. Jaishankar travelled to China to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, but the symbolism and subtext of his bilateral engagements with Chinese leaders—including his counterpart Wang Yi and Vice President Han Zheng—transcended multilateral formalities. With precision and clarity, Jaishankar articulated India’s position on several contentious fronts, reinforcing the principle that cooperation and confrontation can coexist in diplomacy, but the balance must always tilt towards dialogue and peace.
The visit marks a turning point in India-China relations, which nosedived after the June 2020 Galwan Valley confrontation that led to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unspecified number of Chinese troops. Since then, the bilateral discourse has been dominated by military posturing, trade imbalances, and a trust deficit fuelled by China’s repeated incursions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC), particularly in Eastern Ladakh. While multiple rounds of military and diplomatic talks led to partial disengagement, full normalcy remained elusive until a disengagement breakthrough in October 2023 at the Depsang and Demchok sectors created an opening for renewed diplomatic engagement.
Against this backdrop, Jaishankar’s visit to China holds not just symbolic but practical significance. He reiterated India’s expectations for a “visionary approach” to bilateral ties—one grounded in mutual respect, territorial integrity, and peaceful coexistence. In his meeting with Wang Yi, Jaishankar underscored the need for stability and cooperation, especially as both nations hold positions of global importance as emerging economic powers, regional influencers, and key stakeholders in global peacekeeping architecture.
A particularly telling moment came when Jaishankar raised objections to third-party involvement in India-China matters—a veiled but unmistakable reference to Pakistan. His remarks underlined India’s firm stance that China should not let its partnership with Pakistan influence or compromise the bilateral trajectory with India. This is especially relevant in the context of China’s strategic projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), some of which traverse Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), a territory that India claims in full.
Jaishankar’s trip is the latest in a series of high-level visits from India to China, following the recent participation of Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval in SCO events in June. Notably, Singh had refused to sign a joint declaration issued after the defence ministers’ meeting, citing its biased and ambiguous language. This deliberate abstention highlighted India’s unambiguous position on terrorism and its zero-tolerance policy toward states that provide safe havens for extremist elements—a veiled swipe at Pakistan, which continues to enjoy China’s diplomatic shield in international forums.
During his interactions, Jaishankar also revisited the original mandate of the SCO—to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism. He urged his Chinese counterparts to recommit to these founding principles, expressing concern that the SCO risks becoming a hollow platform unless its member states demonstrate collective resolve. In particular, India continues to oppose the soft-pedalling of terrorism-related issues, particularly when they relate to Pakistan-based groups. The implication is clear: India will not allow strategic interests or power alignments to dilute the SCO’s core objectives.
Trade, too, emerged as a key point of contention during the visit. Jaishankar highlighted India’s growing unease over Chinese trade practices that have adversely affected India’s domestic manufacturing. With a trade deficit surpassing $100 billion in China’s favour, India has grown increasingly vocal about unfair practices and import restrictions. Jaishankar candidly warned that such barriers could impede India’s push for Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) and emphasized the need for a more balanced, equitable, and transparent trading ecosystem. He noted that normalizing people-to-people interactions and lifting trade restrictions would serve the mutual benefit of both nations.
Connectivity, cultural exchange, and civilizational diplomacy also found mention in the dialogue. In a promising development, both sides agreed to resume direct air services and restart the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, a sacred pilgrimage route deeply significant to Indian devotees. They also agreed to cooperate on sharing hydrological data regarding trans-border rivers—a long-standing concern for India, given China’s position as the upper riparian state for several major rivers flowing into South Asia.
This apparent recalibration of ties is occurring as geopolitical dynamics in Asia and beyond continue to evolve rapidly. The Modi-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Kazan earlier this year marked the resumption of high-level dialogue after a long freeze, and the stage appears set for Prime Minister Modi’s expected visit to China in September for the SCO Summit. While challenges such as the China-Pakistan nexus, tensions over Taiwan and Tibet, and the legacy of unresolved boundary issues continue to fester, a diplomatic corridor has opened—not necessarily for resolution, but certainly for management and mitigation.
India’s approach—best described as “competition with cooperation”—reflects ”a mature understanding that strategic rivalry does not preclude functional engagement. As Jaishankar observed, nations do not have to agree on everything to work together on something. This realistic stance allows both sides to compartmentalise their disputes while collaborating on areas of shared concern, such as climate change, regional infrastructure, anti-terrorism efforts, and multilateral governance.
Yet, even as India seeks to stabilise ties with China and assert leadership within multilateral platforms like the SCO, the international landscape remains fraught with instability, as seen in the unrelenting violence in the Middle East. This week, Israel intensified its call to dissolve the United Nations’ Gaza War Commission, accusing it of “institutional discrimination” and bias. The commission, created in May 2021, was mandated to investigate alleged human rights abuses during Israel’s conflicts with Hamas—particularly the ongoing war that began after the deadly October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on southern Israel.
Israel claims the commission has consistently condemned its military actions in Gaza while failing to acknowledge the provocations and brutal tactics of Hamas. In a formal move this week, Israel petitioned the UN Human Rights Council to dissolve the body, arguing that its continued existence undermines the credibility of international legal institutions like the International Criminal Court. This development further highlights the deep distrust between sovereign states and global governance bodies, particularly when allegations of bias and double standards come into play.
As the Israel-Hamas conflict grinds on, with its harrowing human cost and regional ramifications, the need for diplomacy over escalation becomes more pressing. The longer such wars are allowed to fester, the greater the risk of entrenching hostilities that no military victory can ever erase. In the backdrop of these crises, Jaishankar’s China visit serves as a reminder that dialogue—however difficult—remains the most viable path to sustainable peace.
For both India and China, the current phase represents a fork in the road: to either descend into perpetual suspicion and military brinkmanship or to embrace a cautious but constructive coexistence. The world, currently lurching from one crisis to another—whether in Gaza, Ukraine, or the Indo-Pacific—has little appetite left for another full-blown confrontation between two of Asia’s largest powers. The stakes are simply too high.
Dr. Jaishankar’s visit to China does not signify a full restoration of trust, but it does indicate a mutual recognition that continued hostility serves neither side’s interest. It offers a diplomatic lifeline in an era where geopolitical fractures are increasingly difficult to bridge. By advocating zero tolerance for terrorism, equitable trade, cultural exchange, and bilateral non-interference, India has articulated a principled yet pragmatic approach. Whether these overtures translate into a durable détente depends on how both nations act in the months to come—and on whether they can resist the temptations of short-term tactical gains in favour of long-term strategic stability.