From the horse’s mouth
Jaideep Saikia
I envisaged the concept of the “Line of Amity” between India and China during the run- up to the “Track-II Dialogue” with the People’s Republic in 2014. The unique meeting of minds was curated by the New Delhi-based India Foundation, and senior personages such as Lt Gen (Retd.) K.T. Parnaik, Amb. G. Parthasarathy, R.N. Ravi and Ram Madhav represented the Indian side. It was nice networking with the Chinese delegation alongside the stalwarts of India, and I was able to refine my comprehension of both China and the Indian way of diplomacy to a considerable extent. The exercise was followed up by a memorable trip to Myanmar with almost the same group for “exchanges” with Myanmarese counterparts and another one with a different set of people to Bangladesh a few years later. It would interest readers to learn that China was actively discussed during meetings with both countries. The point that is being made is that Beijing did not leave New Delhi even in Yangon or Dhaka.
I had, of course, been to China on a standalone “track-II dialogue” in 2002. The top Chinese strategic thinkers I closely interacted with were Wang Hongwei, Ma Jiali, Rong Ying, Cheng Ruisheng, Zhang Guihong and Shen Dingli. I also delivered lectures at Beijing, Zhejiang, and Fudan Universities and think tanks such as the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. The ten-day interface gave me a fairly excellent idea about the Chinese mind. In later years, after I returned from my research in the United States, I began travelling to almost the entire India-China boundary in the Eastern Sector and carefully studying it. I was able to, as a result, perceive China through a new prism from our side of the border.
With the above background in place, I wish to take a relook at the geostrategic paradigm that reconciles the historically fraught Indo-China frontier. I intend to do so by prioritising structural geographic permanence over fluid geopolitical posturing.
For those who came in new, I had proposed the “Line of Amity” concept on 26-27 August 2014 during the course of the aforesaid Indo-China “Track II Dialogue”. With the knowledge that neither side would surrender ground as well as the fact that the only solution lies in converting the “Line of Actual Control” into an international boundary, I took recourse to semantics. I used the instances of the Thagla Ridge held by the Chinese and the Namka Chu River that runs south of the ridge held by the Indians in the Kameng Sector.
It was my considered opinion that at least a change of nomenclature that resonates with accommodation could herald a positive mindset change from the continuous and non-progressive status quo. The name “Line of Amity” has the distinct potential to bring future leaders from both countries to the negotiating table without the burdens of past conflicts and the suspicions that have accompanied nearly all Indo-China boundary discussions, which could serve as a prerequisite for a cordial relationship.
I also laced my plea by stating that altering the name from “Line of Actual Control” to “Line of Amity” would not have any legal implications or bring forth questions about the principle by which delineation of boundaries is normally undertaken. I hazarded this aspect despite the fact that the watershed principle is generally applicable to the Thagla Ridge, which the Chinese presently occupy, and the “Line of Actual Control” in the sub-sector “almost” approximates the “Line” which Henry McMahon drew in 1914 during the Simla Conference.
By anchoring the “Line of Amity” along the Namka Chu—rather than the presently contested “watershed principle” on the crest of the Thagla Ridge—I sought to provide a template for stabilising a disputed boundary. It replaces an ambiguous, militarised Line of Actual Control (LAC) with a definitive, self-enforcing topographic barrier, effectively translating the classical geopolitical wisdom about “rivers as boundaries” into a modern instrument of strategic deterrence and permanent border settlement.
I last visited the Namka Chu in 2018. My right leg, which has metallic implants embedded in it, makes it difficult for me to walk, let alone climb. Moreover, the distance between New Khinzemane and Old Khinzemane via the Foot Suspension Bridge over the Nyamjang Chu and over steps was arduous for my feet. The decaying leg, a result of slithering in the 3rd Mahar Regiment, underwent a rigorous test. However, I need to see things for myself before I speak or write.
The Namka Chu is the perfect natural boundary between India and China in the Kameng sector (or subsector). I was informed by the local commanders at the time that there has been no intrusion or belligerence by the Chinese, and they never come down from the Gordong Camp atop the Thagla Ridge. I was able to see the Chinese encampment from our side.
Since my 2018 visit, the Indian side has undergone significant development. The operation of the Sela Tunnel has fundamentally altered the long-standing military asymmetry between India and China in the sector. Earlier, the primary operational challenge for India was not a lack of tactical resolve but the physical constraints of geography. For decades, the PLA enjoyed a distinct logistical advantage, operating from the flat, vehicle-accessible Tibetan plateau with neat laterals. In contrast, India’s lines of communication were forced to climb the rugged Himalayan chain. The primary obstacle was the 14,000-foot Sela Pass, which routinely choked military transport during winter due to heavy snowfall and landslides. By carving an all-weather passageway beneath this obstruction, the Border Roads organization turned a seasonal bottleneck into a reliable corridor for rapid force projection.
This infrastructural change establishes the physical prerequisite for strategic stability, aligning closely with the conceptual framework of my “Line of Amity”. My thesis argues that true border resolution cannot rely on an ambiguous, shifting line of actual control (LAC). Instead, it demands a formalised, non-negotiable boundary rooted in immutable geographical features, like the natural watershed of the Namka Chu valley and the Thagla Ridge. The Sela Tunnel’s year-round connectivity has neutralised China’s seasonal timing advantage. A stable geographic equilibrium has been established.
Furthermore, by rerouting traffic underground, the Sela Tunnel allows the Indian Army to disguise troop manoeuvres and stage troops without immediate detection. This restored tactical surprise complicates Chinese military planning and deters localised aggression. By eliminating the strategic vulnerabilities that invited the miscalculations of 1962, the tunnel creates a symmetric military balance. This balance forces both nations to respect the geographical status quo rather than attempting to alter it through sudden, opportunistic incursions.
To further negate the remaining geographical asymmetries of the Kameng sector, the Indian side can utilise the verticality of the Himalayan slopes for natural camouflage and create a high-density anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) envelope.
Finally, expanding the “Vibrant Villages Programme” across forward border zones will ensure a permanent populace that will act as an invaluable eyes and ears network for the military.
The “Line of Amity” offers Beijing a pragmatic exit ramp from its multi-theatre deployment cycle by replacing a volatile, overlapping operational environment with definitive structural separation. By formalising the border along the suggested lines, the framework focuses on the current status quo. Furthermore, because Beijing’s primary strategic focus is increasingly prioritising naval projection in the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, stabilising the Himalayan frontier on mutually agreed, immutable topographical lines frees up vital Western Theatre Command resources. The two countries’ “piece-meal” intermediate solution also lends credence to the proposal. The time is ideal for the implementation of the “Line of Amity”.
(Jaideep Saikia was recently appointed a Distinguished Fellow of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research, Delhi. He can be reached at jdpsaikia@gmail.com.)